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ABSTRACT 
NICOLAS LAURENT WENKER: Revolution 2.0: The Political Impact  
of Internet and Social Media Proliferation in Authoritarian Countries 
(Under the direction of Dr. Graeme Robertson) 
 
 Within recent years, Web 2.0 Social Media tools such as social networking 
websites, video-sharing platforms, and micro-blogs have proliferated across the world at 
an exponential rate. While the spread and effects of such technologies have been well-
documented in democratic societies, there has been a comparative poverty of insight into 
Social Media’s implications for authoritarian countries. This void requires urgent redress, 
as it is within such countries that these new tools may have their greatest impact on the 
affairs of the 21
st
 century. Civil societies and social movements have used Social Media 
to challenge authoritarian governments on an unprecedented scale even as these same 
technologies have provided repressive regimes with new opportunities for consolidating 
power. This thesis draws on the preliminary scholarship and a rich spectrum of recent 
empirical developments in order to argue that Social Media proliferation will likely prove 
more advantageous for civil societies than for authoritarian governments.  
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PREFACE 
 
“I call this Revolution 2.0…I say that our revolution is like Wikipedia, OK? Everyone is 
contributing content. You don't know the names of the people contributing the 
content...This is exactly what happened. Revolution 2.0 in Egypt was exactly the same.” 
-Wael Ghonim, Egyptian revolution activist and former Google executive 
 
 
 Shortly after graduating from college in December 2008, I moved to Berlin for the 
first time in order to begin a fellowship at the German Bundestag. Although I probably 
should have concentrated more on my program and on enjoying my time abroad, I 
quickly grew to spending many of my days and nights glued to my laptop screen. I was 
fixated by the graphic YouTube videos and tweets detailing the violent and ruthless 
suppression of young Iranians my own age, courageous activists whose only crime had 
been to call for the same right to self-determination that so many of us in democratic 
countries take for granted. I wanted to do more to seriously study Social Media’s role in 
facilitating anti-authoritarian movements. A year and a half later I found myself back in 
Berlin, with an opportunity to explore this very topic as the subject of my Master’s thesis. 
Barring a major catastrophe, I believe that the spread of new Internet tools will prove to 
be the single most important political development of the 21
st
 century. I can only hope 
that the bravery and creativity of civil activists will outpace the brutality and resources of 
authoritarian regimes. I look forward to seeing the full potential of the Revolution 2.0 as 
it unfolds across 2012 and beyond. 
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 I. Introduction: The Emerging Connection between  
Revolutions, Reforms, and RSS Feeds
 Within the last few years, newspapers, televisions, and websites the world over 
have suddenly been flooded with stories, images, and videos highlighting the growing 
role of new Internet technologies in the ongoing cat-and-mouse games between the 
governments and civil societies of authoritarian countries. From anti-corruption bloggers 
in Russia to political campaigns in Iran to a revolution in Egypt, the Internet and its new 
Web 2.0/Social Media platforms have begun playing outsized roles in the mobilization 
and empowerment of otherwise disadvantaged civil societies. However, some 
authoritarian governments have quickly adapted to these technological developments by 
adopting a variety of customized and sophisticated responses, ranging from China’s 
Orwellian policy of massive censorship and surveillance infrastructure to drastic 
decisions in places such as Libya and Egypt to “turn off” the Internet entirely during 
moments of civil unrest. This purpose of this thesis is to broadly examine the political 
impact of the Internet and new Social Media/Web 2.0 tools on the modern-day struggle 
between authoritarian regimes and civil societies.   
 The rapid proliferation and near-universal utility of Social Media have helped to 
catalyze recent outbreaks of social unrest across a wide spectrum of countries and regions 
around the world. The details, domestic factors, and outcomes of these conflicts have 
varied greatly. Social Media’s impact in these struggles has likewise differed 
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significantly. Some examples of this diversity include Social Media’s central role in 
mobilizing the revolution that ultimately toppled the Mubarak regime in Egypt, its 
disputed role in Iran’s failed “Green Revolution,” its positive-but-minimal footprint in 
anti-authoritarian protests in Yemen, and its employment as an important avenue both for 
challenging as well as for entrenching ruling political parties in Russia and China. This 
diversity offers observers a rich vein for extrapolating common trends and characteristics 
about how and when Social Media proliferation challenges or empowers authoritarian 
governments. In the monumental events that have recently occurred around the world 
across numerous countries and regions, striking parallels and distinct patterns have 
become visible as otherwise very different societies have become embroiled in similar 
cases of civil unrest in which Social Media-inspired activism has played a role. 
Identifying these common trends and characteristics offers a promising direction for 
understanding this new and rapidly-spreading phenomenon, as it may help us to 
categorize the conditions under which a society’s use of Social Media may place it at an 
either advantageous or disadvantageous position in challenging its authoritarian 
government.    
 Social Media platforms, a part of the Web 2.0 family of Internet tools, only first 
began to appear around 2004-2005. Well-known instances where these platforms have 
played a significant role in facilitating or repressing social unrest have occurred even 
more recently. The political novelty of these cases has been matched only by the 
accelerating frequency with which they are suddenly cropping up in a wide variety of 
authoritarian countries around the world. The suddenness of Social Media’s relevance 
and impact has surprised western governments and NGOs, authoritarian regimes, and 
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sometimes even the civil societies and dissidents themselves. Political observers and 
actors long used to basing their calculations and policies on more traditional and 
predictable factors have scrambled to adjust to the sudden emergence of these new 
technologies. At times even experts in the academic and governmental arenas have been 
taken totally unaware by these developments — a problem often confounded by 
generation gaps and a general lack of technological familiarity. This was perhaps  
epitomized just a few days after the 2009 “Green Movement” protests first began 
breaking out in Iran, at which time U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked, ”I 
wouldn’t know a Twitter from a tweeter, but apparently, it is very important” (CBS 
News). Although global media coverage of Internet-powered protest movements quickly 
exploded following the 2009 Iranian protests, this coverage has also itself come under 
harsh criticism. A 2010 expert report entitled “Bullets and Blogs” even argued that such 
journalistic accounts needed to think “more rigorously” about their news coverage by 
stringently examining such stories in terms of the seven oft-neglected dimensions of 
“case selection”, “counterfactuals”, “hidden variables”, “causal mechanisms”, “system 
effects”, “new media outlet selection”, and “strategic interaction” (Aday et al. 6-7). These 
types of complex guidelines highlight the degree to which the Internet’s seemingly-direct 
impact on modern world affairs may actually conceal a multi-faceted and poorly-
understood new phenomenon, particularly in the case of authoritarian countries.  
 The relatively small number of academics and commentators who were actively 
working at the niche intersection of the Internet, Social Media, and authoritarian societies 
prior to 2009 has meant that the existing body of work with which these events can be 
properly analyzed is currently quite limited. To give just one example, Evgeny Morozov 
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— one of the earliest and most prolific writers and lecturers in this area — only released 
his first book on the subject in January 2011 (Morozov, The Net Delusion). Even this 
work is already outdated; almost immediately following its publication, a chaotic year’s 
worth of new case studies and empirical material suddenly appeared as Social Media 
became a factor in instances of significant social unrest and political change across the 
Middle East, Russia, and China. The group of experts from the “Bullets and Blogs” 
report have lamented, “Despite the prominence of ‘Twitter revolutions,’ ‘color 
revolutions,’ and the like in public debate, policymakers and scholars know very little 
about whether and how new media affect contentious politics” (Aday et al. 3). When 
discussing the impact of Social Media in authoritarian countries we are thus dealing with 
— relative to the new technology’s great importance and rapid proliferation — a general 
poverty of expert insight and prior knowledge. This thesis will therefore be based 
primarily on direct examinations of empirical events as they have unfolded in a number 
of different authoritarian nations. More specifically, the thesis will evaluate and detail 
how civil activists, authoritarian regimes, and outside actors have attempted to use Social 
Media to further their own goals when conflicts emerged between the rulers and the ruled 
in authoritarian nations. The primary purpose of this thesis is to analyze to what extent 
Social Media proliferation has impacted the political struggle between civil societies and 
ruling regimes in authoritarian countries.    
 This thesis is broken up into five further sections. The second section will define 
and explain the technologies discussed in this thesis, trace the rapid growth of these 
technologies over the course of the last decade, and introduce the reader to the current 
state of Social Media scholarship. The end of the second section will also elaborate on the 
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specific reasons as to why this thesis is based on an empirical focus and will clarify how 
this thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature on this topic. Sections three, four, 
and five will empirically discuss the history and utility of Social Media from the 
perspectives of civil societies, authoritarian regimes, and outside actors, respectively. The 
third section will discuss how civil societies and dissidents of authoritarian nations have 
attempted to use Social Media in order to challenge their governments. The fourth section 
will analyze how authoritarian regimes have responded to the newfound spread and 
popularity of Social Media. The fifth section will examine the kinds of complications that 
have arisen as outside actors such as Western governments, NGOs, and Social Media 
corporations have become entangled in these new power struggles. The sixth and last 
section will crystallize the developments covered in this paper’s empirical core by 
extrapolating several broad trends about the political impact of Social Media proliferation 
in authoritarian countries. These trends lead the thesis to conclude that 1) Social Media 
proliferation has already incurred a significant degree of political impact and 2) these 
changes, on balance, will likely to be more beneficial for civil societies than for 
authoritarian regimes in the long-term.  
 II. Tracing and Debating the Explosive Growth of Social Media Tools 
 
 
 This thesis will discuss the impact of Internet proliferation in the context of the 
growth of Social Media websites. More specifically, it will examine the potential for 
these platforms to create new communication and mobilization networks among civil 
societies that result in increased political pressure on authoritarian regimes. Andreas M. 
Kaplan and Michael Haenlein of the ESCP Europe have defined Social Media as “a 
group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological 
foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated 
Content” (61). Web 2.0 refers to a set of technologies that allowed a shift from the 
traditional categories of Web content publishing (such as the Encyclopaedia Britannica 
or personal websites) to an era of collaborative projects such as blogs and wikis. Kaplan 
and Haenlein go on to specify,  
When Web 2.0 represents the ideological and technological foundation, 
User Generated Content (UGC) can be seen as the sum of all ways in 
which people make use of Social Media. The term, which achieved broad 
popularity in 2005, is usually applied to describe the various forms of 
media content that are publicly available and created by end-users. 
According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD, 2007), UGC needs to fulfill three basic 
requirements in order to be considered as such: first, it needs to be 
published either on a publicly accessible website or on a social networking 
site accessible to a selected group of people; second, it needs to show a 
certain amount of creative effort; and finally, it needs to have been created 
outside of professional routines and practices. (Ibid.)   
 
 “Social Media” is therefore a broad label used to describe a variety of websites 
and programs. For the purposes of this thesis it is sufficient to be familiar with some of 
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the most well-known examples of Social Media like blogs, content communities like 
YouTube and Flickr, micro-blogs such as Twitter, social networking sites like Facebook, 
collaborative projects like Wikipedia, social game worlds like World of Warcraft, and 
virtual social worlds like Second Life — all platforms where millions of people from all 
over the world come together to create and share content, interactions, and information. 
In July 2010 Facebook announced that it had reached half a billion users (up from 150 
million at the start of 2009), leading The Economist magazine to wonder whether the 
popular platform was eroding or even encroaching upon the traditional conception of a 
sovereign nation-state (“The future”). Twitter, the micro-blogging website where users 
publish information with 140 characters or less at a time, was described by The New York 
Times in 2010 as: 
[O]ne of the rare but fabled Web companies with a growth rate that 
resembles the shape of a hockey stick. It has 175 million registered users, 
up from 503,000 three years ago and 58 million just last year. It is adding 
about 370,000 new users a day. It has helped transform the way that news 
is gathered and distributed, reshaped how public figures from celebrities to 
political leaders communicate, and played a role in popular protests in 
Iran, China and Moldova. (Miller) 
Although most people today are at least somewhat familiar with these prominent Social 
Media platforms and companies, at this juncture it becomes important to note that 
scholars often refer to Social Media within the context of a broader technological wave 
that is itself known by a variety of different labels. This is due to not only the newness of 
this global phenomenon, but also because if its increasingly fluid nature — the dividing 
lines between home computers, laptops, cell phones, smart phones, televisions, e-readers, 
and other devices have become increasingly blurred. Since all of these devices are in 
widespread market use and constant technological development simultaneously, both 
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consumers and manufacturers of these devices have begun mixing and matching the 
utility and software of these platforms at a rapid rate. As a result, social movements and 
civil societies have not developed in a vacuum filled solely with Social Media; on the 
contrary, this social space has been flooded with numerous other tools and innovations. A 
democracy activist in Egypt might log on to YouTube using his smart phone, frequently 
patronizing the platform despite not even owning a computer. A relatively well-off 
dissident in Yemen might first use his laptop to help brainstorm a protest strategy over 
Facebook before subsequently sending out SMS cell phone text messages in order to 
spread the word to a wider network of activists who lack Internet access.  
 This complicated, interacting web of new technologies is referred to in the 
scholarship by a variety of labels including “Digital Media”, “New Media”, “new 
Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs)”, “Computer-Mediated 
Communication (CMC)”, and even the assumption-laden “Liberation Technology.” 
These other terms entail a much broader body of tools than just Social Media platforms. 
The initial scholarship of new ICTs originally analyzed the impact of developments such 
as cell phones and e-mail, which had already developed into a stable area of research by 
the 1990s (Garrett 202-3). The term “new ICTs” has since expanded to include not only 
Web 2.0 platforms, but even the new user techniques (such as crowd-sourcing and 
participatory video) that modern technological tools have spawned (Walton 8-9). Most of 
the other labels are more limited and refer only to the new technologies and devices 
themselves. For example, a 2010 report from the United States Institute of Peace 
concerning Internet use in “contentious politics” such as authoritarian states offered the 
following definition for New Media:   
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‘New media’ is an admittedly unsatisfying term that encompasses a 
diverse array of outlets, such as blogs, “social” media (e.g., Facebook), 
audiovisual hosting services (e.g., YouTube), text messaging (SMS), 
Twitter, e-mail, and chat rooms. While any nomenclature can be 
challenged, the term ‘new media’ is a convenient shorthand for various 
primarily Internet-based communication technologies and methods that 
most people can readily differentiate from ‘old’ media. New media 
generally involve user-generated content, interactivity, and dissemination 
through networks, but new media differ in their characteristics and 
potential political consequences. Indeed, perhaps the most important 
moments involve information that appears on multiple platforms. (Aday et 
al. 28) 
 In his July 2010 article “Liberation Technology”, Larry Diamond defined that 
particular label to mean any kind of ICT that “can expand political, social, and economic 
freedom. In the contemporary era, it means essentially the modern, interrelated forms of 
digital ICT — the computer, the Internet, the mobile phone, and countless innovative 
applications for them, including ‘new social media’ such as Facebook and Twitter” (70). 
Rather than employing these sorts of umbrella terms and analyzing the entire spectrum of 
recent technological advancements, this thesis will focus primarily on the types 
technologies included earlier under the definition of Social Media.  
 The primary objective of this thesis is to evaluate how the rapid growth and reach 
of Social Media platforms have impacted civil societies in countries that enjoy far less 
political freedom (online or otherwise) than their counterparts in the Western world. 
While Social Media may also have become a topic of interest in free and democratic 
societies due to the novelty of celebrity tweets (Twitter messages) or because of 
Facebook’s outreach during political campaigns, the rise of Social Media has been a 
much more profound and transformative development in those societies which are 
currently living under authoritarian rule. For the purposes of this thesis, “civil society” is 
meant to imply the same broad understanding of the term as the one used by social 
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scientists Steve Rayner and Elizabeth Malone (2000). These authors have conceptualized 
civil societies as arenas of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes 
and values. This is similar to Mario Diani’s use of the term “social movements”, which is 
also frequently employed by Internet scholars and defined as “networks of informal 
interaction between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a 
political or cultural conflict on the basis of a shared collective identity” (“The concept of 
social movement” 1). Mainstream scholars of global social movements have even begun 
to single out and praise the Internet for its democratizing impact (Juris).   
 The Internet has not only facilitated increased communication and interaction 
among a given nation’s citizens, but has also encouraged a growing degree of linkage 
between the civil societies and social movements of different countries. The Internet is 
such a perfect fit for the increasingly transnational nature of political and cultural issues 
that it has led some scholars to point to “the transition to a more complex, global 
information-based society that almost logically shaped the context for new forms of 
online activism” (Van Laer and Van Aelst 1150; Jordan and Taylor). As already 
mentioned, Social Media is based primarily around bringing individual users together and 
having exchange information and content. A 2010 report compiled by several experts on 
these technologies found that Social Media platforms “have played a major role in 
episodes of contentious political action. They are often described as important tools for 
activists seeking to replace authoritarian regimes and to promote freedom and democracy, 
and they have been lauded for their democratizing potential” (Aday et al. 3). A 2010 
Helpdesk Research Project focusing on the use of New ICTs in developing countries 
likewise concluded that that Social Media has been “widely used to support human rights 
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campaigns across the developing world, and have presented important opportunities for 
activists in countries with repressive regimes” (Walton 7). To put these findings in 
another way, if we conceptualized civil societies as a sort of engine capable of generating 
political output, in this metaphor Social Media would be a new kind of engine fluid with 
the ability to smoothen and super-charge civil society’s output potential.    
 However, technological advancements in Internet media are not, in and of 
themselves, enough to have an impact on civil society — there must also be a 
meaningfully large enough base of the population willing and able to access these online 
platforms. Fortunately, Social Media’s development has coincided with an explosion of 
Internet use and access outside of the developed world. Take, for example, this excerpt 
from a 2009 article in the Jakarta Times describing how online activism assisted in 
securing the release of two senior officials of the Corruption Eradication Commission 
that the government had detained:  
[T]he two important developments in the case are, first, the way 
Indonesia’s civil society rallied around an issue of national importance, 
and second, the way the Internet helped to facilitate this trend … the 
Internet has played a critical role, serving as a platform for independent 
debate, so much so that mainstream media are left with no choice but to 
start reporting issues that are causing waves in cyberspace … And one can 
only expect this process to accelerate, as technological change gathers 
momentum. While there were only 25 million Internet users in Indonesia 
in 2008, mobile penetration is 60 percent and soaring on the back of a 40 
percent annual growth. At the same time, the explosive increase in 
handheld computing devices … signals a dramatic expansion in Internet 
usage. The Internet is a ‘game-changing’ agent even in a polity such as 
Indonesia where the media is relatively free. (Raslan)  
Larry Diamond has likewise pointed to the example of Malaysia, where citizens are 
finding news alternatives to their regime-dominated media as a result of a massive surge 
in Internet access from 15% of the population in 2000 to 66% in 2009 (70). While 
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scholars have long conducted their research in the context of a “digital divide” between 
developed nations and everyone else, exploding economic, demographic, and 
technological development around the globe has meant that, in the future, widespread 
Internet access will no longer be associated as closely with the Western world as it is 
today (Norris). In September 2010 the Boston Consulting Group reported that:  
In 2009, the BRICI countries — Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
Indonesia — represented about 45 percent of the world’s population … 
and had some 610 million Internet users. By 2015, these countries will 
have more than 1.2 billion Internet users … Internet penetration rates in 
the BRICI countries will experience compound annual growth of 9 to 20 
percent from year-end 2009 through 2015. 
 
Fig. 1. PC Penetration Rates in BRICI Nations, the US, and Japan  
(Boston Consulting Group) 
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Fig. 2. Mobile Phone Penetration in BRICI Nations, the US, and Japan (Ibid.) 
 
 Of course, the growth of the Internet is a major story in developing countries 
other than just those with the largest or fastest-growing economies. The following two 
global maps, taken from a report on Internet censorship by University of Kansas 
Geography Professor Barney Warf, show how much Internet access has spread beyond 
developed countries: 
Fig. 3. Number of Internet Users Worldwide, 2010 (Warf 2) 
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Fig. 4. Internet Penetration Rate Worldwide, 2010 (Ibid. 6) 
 
This explosion in Internet access in the BRICI countries and across the developing world 
has naturally occurred in tandem with the proliferation of other information and 
communication tools. For example, while only 2 out of every 100 people in the 
developing world was a mobile phone subscriber in 1998, by 2008 that number had 
surged to 55 out of 100 (Heeks 22). By 2009 it was estimated that the developing world 
had 2.2 billion mobile phones and 305 million computers (Walton 1). The global 
blogosphere had grown sixty times in size just in the three years between 2003 and 2006, 
with English accounting for less than one-third of blog posts (Castells, “Communication” 
247). A 2007 article in the International Journal of Communication argued:  
[E]ven accounting for the differential diffusion in developing countries and poor 
regions, a very high proportion of the population of the planet has access to 
mobile communication, sometimes in areas where there is no electricity but there 
is some form of coverage and mobile chargers of mobile batteries in the form of 
merchant bicycles. Wifi and wimax networks are helping to set up networked 
communities. With the convergence between Internet and mobile communication 
and the gradual diffusion of broadband capacity, the communicating power of the 
Internet is being distributed in all realms of social life, as the electrical grid and 
the electrical engine distributed energy in the industrial society. (Ibid. 246) 
 OpenNet Initiative co-founders Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski have 
similarly argued that the proliferation of new cyber-technologies like Social Media 
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represents a crucial turning point: “No other mode of communication in human history 
has facilitated the democratization of communication to the same degree. No other 
technology in history has grown with such speed and spread so far geographically in such 
a short period of time” (“Liberation Vs. Control” 43). This diffusion of communication 
power has extended to some of the unlikeliest of places. Even in North Korea, arguably 
the world’s most isolated society, citizens are smuggling in mobile phones from China 
and using them to report on their horrific situation to the outside world via the Chinese 
mobile network (Sang-Hun).   
 Increased access to the Internet and other communication tools have been 
accompanied by another important trend emerging across much of the developing world 
— demographic shifts that have resulted in extremely young populations. Even before the 
emergence of Web 2.0’s powerful networking tools, scholars in the early 2000s were 
already drawing connections between increases in Internet use and significant booms in 
youth activism; one study of the so-called “Digital Generation” noted, “While it would be 
overly simplistic to suggest that the Internet caused this recent rise in student activism, it 
is clear that online communications have played an important role in facilitating activism, 
both domestically and globally” (Montgomery, Larson, and Gottlieb-Robles 88). Many of 
the authoritarian countries that will be examined in this thesis are predominantly 
comprised of young populations that are willing to protest against the government and are 
likely to have the technological know-how needed to network and organize over the 
Internet.   
 For example, one empirical study of the Internet’s political impact in Iran 
highlighted, that “International Telecommunications Union data suggests that 32.3 
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percent of Iranians used the Internet in 2007, compared to 4.7 percent in 2002. Among 
urbanized youth populations likely to be involved in contentious politics, Internet usage 
is almost certainly higher” (Aday et al. 13). Many non-Western countries today feature 
extremely young populations where the majority of citizens are less than thirty years old, 
creating cultures that are accustomed to an increasingly-interconnected world where the 
Internet access is a routine social phenomenon. Even China, an overall aging society, 
added more new Internet users in 2009 than the entire population of Germany (Reuters). 
Looking closely at its user growth, it becomes apparent China has also followed the same 
youth-centric trend; Fengshu Liu of the University of Oslo has noted that “the Internet in 
China is so far a predominantly urban-youth phenomenon, with people under 30, 
especially 10- to 19-year-olds…as the major group of netizens” (7). As a result of recent 
economic, technological, and demographic changes, many authoritarian countries have 
been exposed to a variety of new conditions that are slowly enabling the citizenry of 
these nations to take full advantage of Social Media’s socio-political dimensions.   
 Despite the prevalence and importance of this development, we are — as 
mentioned in the introduction — currently dealing with a general paucity of 
comprehensive academic literature and scholarly insight into this phenomenon. The last 
several years have already generated a substantial pool of academic and professional 
literature (particularly in the field of communication studies) offering a more generalized 
analysis of Web 2.0 tools and popular Social Media platforms (see for example Zickuhr, 
Smith, and Fox). Regrettably, more specific studies of how Web 2.0 technologies have 
impacted reform and social movements in authoritarian countries are still largely missing 
— and characterized by high degrees of academic disagreement even when available 
  
17 
(Zuckerman).   
 The state of Social Media literature is slowly beginning to improve as scattered 
pieces of scholarship coalesce into a more comprehensive pool of substantial work and 
meaningful debate. Huma Haider (2011) recently produced an insightful literature survey 
testifying to this progress. Haider’s survey led him to conclude that the current literature 
places an emphasis on several factors that “may contribute to the success or weakness of 
Social Media and in turn the success or weakness of protests and movements that rely on 
them,” namely leadership, links to conventional media and other activists, elite reaction, 
and external attention (2). Some authors have even offered up tentative and preliminary 
methodological frameworks. For example, Jeroen Van Laer and Peter Van Aelst (2010) 
have created a generalized model for mapping various types of online activism based 
along the two dimensions of “Internet-supported versus Internet-based” and “high versus 
low threshold.” Another collaboration between several experts resulted in a model for 
evaluating particular case studies; the authors found that “The impact of new media can 
be better understood through a framework that considers five levels of analysis: 
individual transformation, intergroup relations, collective action, regime policies, and 
external attention” (Aday et al. 3). Other models are certain to emerge in the near future 
as scholars begin to test, debate, and improve these kinds of frameworks.   
 Nonetheless, despite these and other examples of recent progress, an enormous 
amount of work remains to be done before observers can fully get a grip on such a new 
and important phenomenon. In the words of one expert, “We have yet to see the real 
social or political impact of the participatory Internet because it simply hasn’t existed for 
long enough” (Sasaki). A joint report by several experts in late 2010 lamented this dearth 
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of information by writing, “Do new media have real consequences for contentious 
politics — and in which direction?…fundamentally, no one knows. To this point, little 
research has sought to estimate the causal effects of new media in a methodologically 
rigorous fashion, or to gather the rich data needed to establish causal influence” (Aday et 
al. 5). Ya-Wen Lei of the University of Michigan complained just recently in 2011 that 
“There is a vast literature empirically studying the Internet’s political implications in 
Western liberal democracies, but there are few such studies researching authoritarian 
countries, where, ironically, political development is a more critical issue” (292). 
Scholars analyzing the impact of ICTs on social movements have likewise noted that the 
“empirical analysis of the negative consequences of new ICTs” has been “largely absent 
in the literature” (Garrett 218). To date, much of the literature in these fields has fallen 
into one of two categories of analysis: either it discusses and partially links the variety of 
involved actors and factors in a heavily theoretical framework, or it aims to provide a 
more concrete, empirical analysis of one isolated incident. Very little scholarship exists 
that has attempted to analyze the full range of relevant cases and actors while still 
remaining grounded in a case-heavy, primarily empirical discussion. This thesis seeks to 
help address this deficit by providing a comprehensive, empirically-based overview of 
recent global developments across numerous countries in which various civil societies, 
authoritarian regimes, and outside actors have sought use the Internet and Social Media to 
achieve their political objectives.   
 The thesis therefore aims to contribute to the literature in three primary ways. 
Firstly, it will provide a primarily empirically-based discussion of this subject by tackling 
the daunting task of analyzing Social Media’s impact in the context of a wide variety of 
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country/incident cases. It is hoped that by presenting a large body of empirical data 
derived from across a broad spectrum of recent international events, this will serve to 
persuasively highlight the strikingly repetitive patterns in Social Media’s political utility 
for otherwise different civil societies and authoritarian governments. This should 
demonstrate the near-universality of Social Media’s characteristics, in that different civil 
societies have embraced Social Media with astonishing speed and consistently similar 
tactics (such as citizen journalism or street mobilization) even as different authoritarian 
regimes have responded with consistently similar exploitations of Social Media’s innate 
weaknesses (i.e., limiting or disabling telecommunications infrastructure, spying on 
social networking sites, etc.). Highlighting these consistencies across a large quantity of 
different examples should help to overcome a common criticism that some scholars have 
made about the empirical studies that focus exclusively on individual cases (e.g., the 
2009 Iranian election protests): that the “data” offered up for discussion is merely a 
limited smattering of potentially-misleading anecdotes and can therefore not be used to 
extrapolate any broad conclusions (Aday et al. 3).   
 Secondly, this thesis aims to go beyond the typically limited focus of empirical 
Social Media papers — which usually focus exclusively on the civil society-regime 
struggle — by including a section analyzing the complicated involvement and 
motivations of outside actors such as democratic governments, NGOs, private 
corporations, and the actual Social Media companies themselves. This will hopefully 
provide readers with a more comprehensive and informed understanding of Social 
Media’s complicated role and varying degrees of impact in recent world events.   
 Thirdly, this thesis incorporates new, key empirical cases that occurred in 2011 
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and in the beginning of 2012. This most recent wave of Social Media-influenced protests 
in the Arab Spring countries, China, and Russia has not only greatly contributed to the 
quantity of empirical data, but has proffered up the most striking cases to date of 
instances where Social Media has played a direct role in impacting and sustaining social 
movements and civil societies in authoritarian nations. As most of the already-limited 
body of empirical scholarship currently available in the literature dates to 2010 or even 
earlier, it is hoped that a thesis incorporating up-to-date information will be useful to 
those interested in Social Media’s political impact. In order to accomplish these three 
goals, the following sections will therefore empirically trace the history and utility of 
Social Media from the perspectives of civil societies, authoritarian regimes, and outside 
actors, respectively. The next section begins this discussion with an examination of Web 
2.0’s beneficial implications for social movements and civil societies in authoritarian 
countries.  
 III. Social Media and Its Utility for Civil Societies,  
Dissidents, and Social Movements 
 
 
 2011 marked an important turning point for Social Media’s impact in 
authoritarian countries. Web 2.0’s powerful potential — which had been only tentatively 
and tangentially harvested by civil societies during protests in the years immediately prior 
— suddenly exploded across a large number of high-profile cases in several different 
authoritarian countries around the world. This sudden surge is most likely due to a variety 
of factors, including that Social Media tools have become more technologically robust, 
that more citizens have obtained Internet access, that more users have become active 
members of Web 2.0 social networks, and that the leaders of dissidence movements have 
become more comfortable and skilled with using Social Media as tools for political 
mobilization and organization. Some of the better-known examples of the 2011-2012 
Social Media explosion include the Cairo “Facebook flats” that played a pivotal role in 
Egypt’s uprising, the amateur YouTube videos of ballot-box stuffing recorded by dutiful 
citizens on their cell phones during the 2011 Russian elections, and the increased quantity 
and boldness of socio-political micro-blogging activity in China.   
 This current wave emerged in the wake of what could be considered a type of 
initial incubation period from roughly 2004 to early 2009, during which time the earliest 
Web 2.0 tools and social networks were only used intermittently by dissidents, reform 
movements, and anti-authoritarian protestors. The earliest high-publicity incident that can 
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be traced to this initial wave occurred in the Ukraine. After analyzing the 2004-2005 
Ukrainian “Orange Revolution”, Harvard’s Berkmen Center concluded:   
While a wide range of factors shaped the events and out-comes of the 
Orange Revolution, the Internet and mobile phones proved to be effective 
tools for pro-democracy activists. First, the Internet allowed for the 
creation of a space for dissenting opinions of ‘citizen journalists’ in an 
otherwise self-censored media environment. Second, pro-democracy 
activists used the convergence of mobile phones and the Internet to 
coordinate a wide range of activities including election monitoring and 
large-scale protests. (Goldstein 9)  
Larry Diamond arrived at these same findings in his own scholarship, noting in 2010, 
“Liberation technology figured prominently in the Orange Revolution that toppled the 
electoral authoritarian regime in Ukraine via mass protests during November and 
December 2004” (78). In addition, he says, digital tools “also facilitated the 2005 Cedar 
Revolution in Lebanon…the 2005 protests for women’s voting rights in Kuwait; the 2007 
protests by Venezuelan students against the closure of Radio Caracas Television; and the 
April 2008 general strike in Egypt” (Ibid.). These events — and the supposed role that 
Social Media and the Internet played in facilitating them — received varying degrees of 
attention from media and policy-makers and solicited mixed conclusions from scholars. 
Even Moldova’s widely-publicized, so-called “Twitter Revolution” — which culminated 
in a 20,000-person Social Media-organized “flash mob” storming the Communist-
controlled parliament building — has been the subject of fierce and inconclusive debate 
as to whether Social Media actually played a significant role in the event (Stack).   
 Iran’s captivating “Green Revolution” in 2009-2010 marked a global turning 
point in the amount of public, media, and scholarly attention paid to Social Media’s 
political potential (Mackey). The lead-up to the Iranian presidential election and its 
bloody aftermath present perhaps one of the most reported (and contested) examples of 
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Social Media as a tool for powering reform movements (Cohen, R., “Iran’s Day of 
Anguish”; Morozov, “Iran Elections”; Esfandiari, “Misreading Tehran”). Even before the 
election, Iran’s young population gave the country the “highest Internet penetration in the 
region,” inspiring the country’s collective nickname of “weblogistan” and a growing 
frequency of arrests and persecutions of Iranian bloggers by the regime (Macintyre). As 
Larry Diamond has pointed out, in the years preceding the 2009 election protests, “Iran’s 
online public sphere had been growing dramatically…the explosion of Facebook to 
encompass an estimated 600,000 Persian-language users; and the growing utilization of 
the Internet by news organizations, civic groups, political parties, and candidates” (79). 
Other scholars using even higher figures have noted, “Indeed, with an estimated 75,000 
blogs, the Iranian blogosphere may exceed the size of its entire Arab counterpart” (Aday 
et al. 13). Over the last decade, new ICTs have suddenly come to play a fundamental role 
in facilitating self-expression and conceptions of personal identity among urban Iranian 
youth. One empirical study even analyzed Bluetooth’s pivotal function as a “hidden 
medium” for facilitating social dynamics among young people living in Tehran (Niknam 
1187).  
 In Iran’s 2009 presidential election, the more liberal, reformist candidate ran a 
campaign powered to a large extent by Social Media and SMS text messaging and the 
hordes of young Iranians who knew how to use them (Etling). The government 
(controlled by the hard-line incumbent) responded with forays into blocking or banning 
Facebook and other applications (Kirkpatrick, M.). After hundreds of thousands of 
protestors marched in Tehran and other cities to protest the incumbent’s supposed re-
election victory, the government responded with not only violence and arrests but also a 
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massive and all-encompassing black-out campaign on traditional news outlets and Social 
Media (Foster). As a result, an electronic civil war erupted in Iran as tech-savvy 
dissenters utilized advanced Web tricks and “proxy” servers offered by the global 
diaspora and sympathizers in order to continue mobilizing and to digitally smuggle 
YouTube videos and Flickr pictures of graphic government violence to the outside world 
— all while transnational “hacktivists” groups launched attacks on government websites 
and servers (The Washington Times; Ahmed; Bray, “Finding a way”). Although the 
sudden frenzy of media attention surrounding the role of the Internet in Iran led at times 
to inaccurate and overenthusiastic reporting and analysis, this should not take away from 
either the successful use of online tools by protestors or from the importance that Web 
2.0 platforms played in allowing Iranian protestors to globally broadcast media 
showcasing the brutality of the regime and proof of the Green Movement’s mass support.  
 Even more so than the Green Revolution, events in the Arab world since January 
2011 have provided a stunning display of Social Media’s political power at work. 
Commentators such as the American journalist Roger Cohen have discussed the 
importance of Social Media in energizing civil society during the Arab Spring by 
pointing specifically to the online applicability of cultural feelings such as “Arab dignity” 
(Cohen, R., “Facebook and Arab Dignity”). For example, in Tunisia, membership in 
protest groups on Facebook and cell phone photos uploaded to the site spread like 
wildfire as people went online to finally vent their long-held feelings of humiliation at the 
hands of an authoritarian regime unable to satisfy basic needs such as jobs for the 
swelling ranks of unemployed youths (Ibid.). Likewise, in the lead-up to the massive 
show-down with the regime in Egypt, Web-savvy young Egyptians helped to mobilize 
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people by using Social Media to appeal to public outrage; as reported by The New York 
Times, “In the days leading up to the protests, more than 90,000 people signed up on a 
Facebook page for the ‘Day of Revolution,’ organized by opposition and pro-democracy 
groups…The organizers framed the protest as a stand against torture, poverty, corruption 
and unemployment” (Fahim and El-Naggar, “Violent Clashes”). The young, mostly 
under-30 online activists on Facebook and other platforms eventually coalesced together 
in order to organize and lead more effectively, merging together online movements such 
as the April 6 Youth Movement that had originally first up in 2008 (Wolman, “Cairo 
Activists”).  
 Happily surprised at the 90,000-plus turn-out for the “Day of Rage,” they took a 
commanding lead in continuing and strengthening the anti-government protests spreading 
throughout the country. This surprised and largely circumvented traditional, older 
opposition groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohamed ElBaradei’s liberal 
faction; as The New York Times reported during the uprising:   
They decided to follow a blueprint similar to their previous protest, urging 
demonstrators to converge on the central Liberation Square. So they drew 
up a list of selected mosques around Cairo where they asked people to 
gather at Friday Prayer before marching together toward the square. Then 
they distributed the list through e-mail and text messages, which spread 
virally. They even told Dr. ElBaradei which mosque he should attend, 
people involved said. (Kirkpatrick and El-Naggar) 
Although many of these Web-savvy organizers initially came from the ranks of Egypt’s 
relatively elite class of university students and young professionals, they quickly adapted 
their tactics and messaging to appeal to and rally larger segments of Egypt’s extremely 
young population (Kirkpatrick, D., “Wired and Shrewd”). 
By combining Web 2.0 tools with a shrewd understanding of their fellow citizens, the 
online activists were thus able to link massive numbers of people with lightning-quick 
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organizational and leadership capacities:  
They brought a sophistication and professionalism to their cause — 
exploiting the anonymity of the Internet to elude the secret police, planting 
false rumors to fool police spies, staging ‘field tests’ in Cairo slums before 
laying out their battle plans, then planning a weekly protest schedule to 
save their firepower — that helps explain the surprising resilience of the 
uprising they began (Ibid.). 
Egypt’s experience in 2011 thus became one of the best-
known symbols of Web 2.0-facilitated social movements 
to date, despite the fact that its proportion of Internet 
access (barely 20%) is much lower than in Tunisia or 
Iran (Sifry). This demonstrates that authoritarian leaders 
cannot necessarily depend on widespread poverty or low 
overall levels of online access to blunt the political 
potential of Web 2.0 tools.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Facebook Event for Egypt’s   
“Day of Rage” on January 25th, 2011 (Rusila) 
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Fig. 6. Pro-Facebook Graffiti in Cairo during the Egyptian Uprising (Badawai) 
 
 In the new digital age, even a small core of dedicated elites can use the Internet to 
quickly take advantage of mass social unrest among the general public. Gone are the days 
when it took many years and an elaborate unifying ideology for revolutionary leaders like 
the Bolsheviks to gather together and successfully rally movements against the 
government. The New York Times has even published a “digital road to Egypt’s 
revolution” from 2008-2011 that traces key events in cyberspace that helped to pave the 
way for the country’s eventual uprising (Wolman, “The Digital Road”). Wael Ghonim, 
the celebrated online activist and Google engineer who played a central role before and 
during Egypt’s uprising, has since taken to referring to the role played by Social Media in 
the Arab Spring as a new kind of “Revolution 2.0” (The Economist, “Revolution 2.0”). 
Social networks make it much easier for dedicated political activists and dissidents to 
find one another, coordinate their efforts, and widen their networks of willing 
participants.   
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 The ongoing crisis in Syria provides another gripping example testifying to the 
strengths as well as to the limitations of Internet-supported social movements. It is 
important to note that there are numerous differences between the situation in this 
country and the one that unfolded in Egypt, such as the existence of ethnic and religious 
minority sects loyal to the regime as well as the government’s willingness to use heavy 
military force against its own people. Nonetheless, there are several parallels to the 
Egyptian case in terms of how the civil societies in Syria and elsewhere have attempted 
to use Social Media for political purposes. The Assad regime has been very active about 
monitoring and censoring the Internet since well before the advent of the Web 2.0 age. 
Syrian bloggers and online activists have frequently been warned, harassed, and arrested 
with sometimes startling randomness throughout entirety of the 2000s (Worth). Despite 
these campaigns of intimidation, the socio-political use of Social Media grew steadily in 
Syria prior to the Arab Spring. For example, these platforms were used to share feelings 
of outrage over hot-button issues such as teacher violence against students, at times 
forcing the government to take action on particularly egregious issues (Ibid.).   
 Now that the Arab Spring has reached Syria and conflict and unrest have spread 
throughout the country, Social Media is being used in capacities similar to those seen in 
other Arab Spring uprisings. In scenes directly reminiscent of those seen in Cairo 
apartments in the first half of 2011, Syrian refugees and activists set up a hodgepodge of 
“revolutionary media centers” in cellars and refugee camps. The Spartan conditions of 
these operations — one New York Times journalist described a “bare room whose floors 
were covered with thin mattresses strewn with digital cameras, laptops, modems and a 
tangle of cords” — show the dedication of these netizens and the importance that they 
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attribute to their sustained ability to stay connected to the outside world by uploading 
pictures and videos (Ou and Harris; Stack). Social Media’s key role in getting 
information and recordings out of Syria has led activists in the region to call the conflict 
the “first YouTube War,” with an estimated 80% of the international mainstream media 
footage of the violence coming from amateur recordings shot inside the country 
(Nordland).   
Fig. 7. Political Cartoon on Social Media’s Prominence in the Syrian Conflict  
(The Economist, “The tide turns”). 
 
 Of particular interest are developments like the Shaam News Network, a Syrian 
website put together by dissidents in order to collect cell phone pictures and Twitter 
updates streaming in from across the country’s ongoing uprising. Despite what were 
likely quite low investment costs of manpower and actual money, SNN’s coverage has 
been picked up by the international media networks banned from Syria (Friedmen). 
These examples of the so-called “You News Network” have been garnering increased 
attention from both the global media and from serious academics (Tsotsis). Some 
scholars have responded to this growing display of citizen journalism by analyzing it 
under the framework of “participatory media.” Global Voices executive Director Ivan 
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Sigal authored a 2009 report on Digital Media in conflict-prone societies in which he 
applied such a framework and noted, “Several characteristics of digital media platforms 
have changed the dynamic of participation in the production and distribution of 
information” (15). In his view, the shift to Digital Media primarily encompassed the 
following four changes and benefits:  
Fig. 8. Ivan Sigal’s Dynamics of Participation Changes Stemming (Digital Media)  
(Sigil 15-6) 
 Radically reduced cost for person-to-person communication, via Internet, 
digital and cellular telephony, using applications such as text messaging and 
voice-over-Internet protocol (VOIP). 
 Reduced cost and ease of entry for producers of information with desktop 
publishing, digital video and photography. 
 Direct, unmediated links between individuals in peer networks, collectively 
creating a networked public sphere. 
 Shifting demographics of information communities beyond traditional nation 
or state audiences, driven by the transnational nature of Internet, cell-phone 
networks and satellite TV. 
It should be noted that, as positive empowering as such new participation opportunities 
may be, significant political impact is not guaranteed. It is certainly possible for these 
types of citizen journalism to successfully pressure authoritarian regimes, but only if they 
succeed in capturing the attention of domestic or international actors capable and willing 
to exert leverage on the government. For example, after the junta in Myanmar initiated a 
brutal crackdown in 2007, “Burmese people connected among themselves and to the 
world relentlessly, using short message service (SMS) and E-Mails, posting daily blogs, 
notices on Facebook, and videos on YouTube…This exposure embarrassed their Chinese 
sponsors and induced the United States and the European Union to increase diplomatic 
pressure on the junta” (Castells, “The New Public Sphere” 86). In the Syrian case, to 
what degree Web 2.0’s ability to disseminate information across borders will actually 
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help the dissidents already under brutal assault still remains to be seen. 
Transnationalization is not in and of itself automatically sufficient to change a regime’s 
behavior, a fact that will be examined in more detail in the fourth section of this thesis.   
 The events of 2011 have also neatly demonstrated the huge discrepancy among 
different authoritarian governments in how seriously they prepared for the Internet’s 
latent political potential. In contrast to pre-existing programs for online surveillance in 
Egypt and the Mubarak government’s constant suspicion of Facebook, the Tunisian 
regime of President Ben Ali seemed in many ways to have been caught largely off-guard 
when it experienced its own Social Media-facilitated protest movement. Before it 
eventually fell to protestors, the government attempted a sudden eleventh-hour effort to 
finally recognize and adapt to the growing important of Social Media; as The New York 
Times reported in January, “It was an apt symbol that a dissident blogger with thousands 
of followers on Twitter, Slim Amamou, was catapulted in a matter of days from the 
interrogation chambers of Mr. Ben Ali’s regime to a new government post as minister for 
youth and sports” (Shane). Authoritarian governments trying to keep a lid on dissent 
often walk a fine line between over- and under-reacting to online activism.   
 The experiences of the Arab Spring countries have also highlighted how the 
transnationalization capacity of Web 2.0 tools have challenged regimes used to dealing 
with largely closed, domestic systems of social control. It is clearly much more difficult 
for repressive regimes to continue maintaining a tight lid on domestic affairs in an age 
where movements and information are becoming increasingly transnational and 
international. Online activists and Internet-publicized social movements in a particular 
country can quickly gather global sympathizers, as already discussed in the case of Iran. 
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Since the beginnings of the Arab Spring, the large, unpredictable, and devastatingly 
effective global hacker group known as Anonymous has been paralyzing the websites of 
authoritarian governments and political parties in the Middle East (Somaiya). Human 
rights organizations and other NGOs have also been actively involved in distributing and 
developing anti-censorship and anti-surveillance software and tools, as will be discussed 
more in the fifth section of this thesis. Not only did Egyptians and Tunisians go online to 
trade tips and tactics with each other (such as how to build barricades, withstand teargas, 
and avoid online surveillance), leaders from both movements had spent the prior few 
years studying the successful tactics of Serbia’s successful youth movement Optor, which 
was itself inspired by the writings on non-violent struggle by American political thinker 
Gene Sharp (Sanger and Kirkpatrick). The ability for ideas and information to cross 
national borders — always a persistent challenge for autocratic regimes — has become 
super-charged in the Web 2.0 era.  
 Of course, the simple exchange of information is not sufficient to bring people to 
the streets, especially in the face of the time-tested and effective repression tactics usually 
practiced by authoritarian governments. Social Media can also embolden and empower 
reform movements and popular protests by removing the omnipresent sense of fear and 
isolation that authoritarian regimes try to cultivate through the use of force and through 
state control of traditional media outlets. As a result, ordinary people can see when their 
peers pour into the streets en masse to protest and demonstrate, even when these events 
are occurring in different parts of the country. For example, as events in Libya got 
underway and the Gadhafi regime’s propaganda continuously insisted that it faced very 
little popular opposition, one technology expert set up cameras with live online-streaming 
  
33 
throughout Benghazi, allowing Libyans in other cities to see the growing size of the 
protests (CNN Wire Staff). When rebels eventually took the capital much later on in the 
uprising, they made it a priority to immediately head to the state telecoms company to 
text message the news to citizens across the country and to restore Libya’s Internet 
access, which had previously been cut off by the government in order to limit information 
about the extent of the revolution (The Economist, “Going, going…”).   
 Web 2.0 sharing and networking tools are also excellent for conveying and 
sharing traditional vehicles of revolutionary messages such as art and music. In Tunisia, 
rappers used Social Media to post and share music videos and songs in order to spread 
messages criticizing the regime — music which in some cases went electronically viral 
throughout the country only after the artists were arrested as a result of releasing the 
songs, demonstrating again that the publicizing ability of the Internet can complicate 
traditional authoritarian tactics for suppressing dissent (Curry). The Mubarak regime at 
one point found itself in a similar situation when it arrested and detained former Google 
executive Wael Ghonim for running the opposition Facebook group “We Are All Khaled 
Said,” a blunder that ultimately resulted in Ghonim’s emotional T.V. interview and the 
subsequent revitalization of street protests (Kirkpatrick, D., “As Egypt Protest Swells”).   
 The story of anti-authoritarian rappers in the Middle East also directly parallels 
Bert Hoffman’s findings regarding rappers in Cuba, which he believed represented the 
“development of the collective identity of actors empowered by digital media” (23). 
Hoffman believes that “The…movement of critical rap singers whose increased 
autonomy vis-à-vis the state relies on the use of digital media can be understood…as a 
‘new modus of non-conventional collective action’ within an authoritarian context” (Ibid. 
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23; Geoffray). Under this perspective, Internet-enabled defiance of the state can actually 
have a three-pronged effect; it challenges the authority of the regime by circumventing 
state control of media and cultural propaganda, it allows citizens to carve out a new, non-
state-owned public sphere, and it creates new types of social bonds and communities as 
citizens join together in challenging the state within this new sphere.  
 In countries where the Arab Spring has not yet taken root, the potential for mass 
participation in — and eventual political mobilization via — Social Media still remains 
quite rich. In the case of Iraq, it has an even younger population than Egypt, Libya, and 
Tunisia, with almost 40% of the population at or under 14 years of age — raising the 
possibility of widespread Web-friendliness among voters in the body politic even a few 
short years down the road. In the words of one 19-year-old law student from Kirkuk, 
“The youth is the excluded class in the Iraqi community, so they’ve started to unify 
through Facebook or the Internet or through demonstrations and evenings in cafes, 
symposiums and in universities” (Arango). Social Media may come to play a role even in 
Yemen, which is the poorest country in the Arab world and has a 45% illiteracy rate and 
limited Internet access. The country has already experienced protests wherein young 
netizens held pro-Facebook signs and used Social Media to spread information about the 
government’s attacks on dissidents (CNN, “Yemen’s Youth”).  
 Depending on how deeply Internet access has penetrated a country, civil societies 
have shown themselves to be remarkably creative in combining different mediums and 
technologies — in effect using Social Media to whatever extent possible while still using 
other methods to reach fellow citizens who are not available online. In the case of 
Yemen, young activists began organizing mass youth protests and demonstrations by 
  
35 
combining Social Media tools with heavy text messaging campaigns (Kasinof and 
Goodman). In July 2011 Philip Howard and Muzammil Hussain published a paper about 
the role of digital media in the Arab Spring in which they noted that:  
[O]ne of the most consistent narratives from civil society leaders in Arab 
countries has been that the Internet, mobile phones, and social media such 
as Facebook and Twitter made the difference this time. Using these 
technologies, people interested in democracy could build extensive 
networks, create social capital, and organize political action with a speed 
and a scale never seen before. (35-6)  
   
The authors argued that the digital road of the Arab Spring could be traced clearly in the 
six unfolding phases of “preparation,” “ignition,” “streets protests,” “international buy-
in,” “climax,” and “follow-on information warfare” (Ibid. 42). The events of 2011-2012 
represent a rich starting point for making large strides in the academic literature, as these 
new sample cases are complex and numerous enough that they allow for preliminary 
models that can then be tested against future events.  
 Although some authoritarian countries have allowed only heavily monitored and 
limited access to the Internet in a bid to prevent an online socio-political discourse among 
its citizens, the simple fact is that a large enough pool of people engaged in networking 
and communicating online will inevitably and unendingly discuss common social issues 
and current events. Such topics are, of course, often inherently political. Some skeptical 
scholars from the early 2000s flat-out doubted the Internet’s potential for any kind of 
meaningful social change because they simply assumed that any public sphere to 
eventually emerge online would be intrinsically constrained by existing political 
institutions and economy (Papacharissi). This particular argument now looks less 
convincing as some of the subsequent Web 2.0-era scholarship has since suggested that 
new ICTs — and Social Media in particular — have resulted in the globalization and 
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transnational of a “new public sphere” (Castells, “A New Public Sphere”).   
 Under this opposing perspective, particularly optimistic scholars assert,“In sum, 
the global civil society now has the technological means to exist independently from 
political institutions and from the mass media” (Ibid. 86). This is substantiated by some 
empirical studies that have shown that “the more [a citizen] uses the Internet, the more 
autonomous he/she becomes vis-à-vis societal rules and institutions” (Castells, 
“Communication” 249). Bert Hoffman’s Web 2.0-era analysis of Cuba similarly found 
that, in contrast to the “struggles for associational autonomy within the state-socialist 
framework” of the pre-Internet early 1990s, “A decade later, web-based communication 
technologies have supported the emergence of a new type of public sphere in which civil 
society debate is marked by autonomous citizen action” (3). Hoffman’s analysis of Cuba 
led the author the same conclusion that James Holston reached in a 2008 study of Brazil; 
both scholars felt that citizen-created media created a type of “insurgent citizenship” in 
which “using citizen media becomes a civic action in itself” (Hoffman 23; Holston). Not 
only is it incredibly difficult for authoritarian states to successfully facilitate a type of 
partly-usable Internet environment that somehow avoids any discussion of social 
problems, the very act of pushing such restrictions can backfire by transforming ordinary 
Internet use into a deliberate expression of civil activism.   
 Defying or skirting around the government’s restrictions in such a manner can, in 
turn, create new ties and communities founded on anti-authoritarian disobedience. 
Similar to how the Tunisian regime’s attempts to suppress rap music actually resulted in 
the opposite effect, active efforts to censor and limit the emergence of an Internet-based 
public sphere can actually result in the creation of new social ties and group identities 
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based on anti-authoritarian defiance and resentment. This phenomenon seems so 
widespread that scholars may one day move beyond asking whether or not Social Media 
can facilitate anti-authoritarian communities; if a consensus emerges that this possibility 
definitely exists, experts will then be confronted by the more difficult task of tracing what 
happens to such movements in the event that they succeed in toppling authoritarian 
regimes.   
 For example, it remains to be seen what degrees of influence the Arab Spring’s 
so-called “Facebook youth” will manage to exert once their authoritarian governments 
have been toppled and the messy work of long-term democratization and political 
maneuvering begins (MacFarquhar and Amar; Seligson). In the case of Egypt, the ruling 
military council has taken to imprisoning bloggers and other online activists who rose to 
prominence during the revolution and has resorted to attacking foreign pro-democracy 
groups aiming to revitalize the country’s civil society (Associated Press, “Egypt’s 
Army”). These efforts have, in turn, refocused popular attention on key criticisms of the 
country’s military, including the mass detention and prosecution of civilians through 
military trials (Ibid.). The continuing tug-of-war between activists and authorities in 
Egypt even in the post-Mubarak era demonstrates that the Internet is only a medium by 
which social movements and dissidents can leverage their demands — not a magic bullet 
for instantly curing all of country’s political problems.     
 Growing Internet access and the proliferation of Social Media networks have 
placed authoritarian regimes into a difficult “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” 
dilemma in which typical tactics of asserting control no longer offer straightforward 
results. One of the reasons the Egyptian April 6
th
 Youth Movement was so quickly able 
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to gather so much steam with its discussion of social issues was because the traditional 
opposition movements. This effectively gave the April 6
th
 leaders and their outraged calls 
for mobilization a high level of comparative credibility and popular support (Shapiro). 
 While some critics have asserted that Social Media activity is incapable of 
generating lasting social movements because online activism represents no real danger or 
social commitment, this presumption has come under strong assault in light of the very 
real dangers faced by the netizens of authoritarian countries. In his 2011 article on new 
ICT democratization in Africa, Herman Wasserman questioned the widely-held 
assumption that “social networking is low-risk” by pointing to examples like Fouad 
Mourtada (jailed for impersonating the Moroccan king’s brother on Facebook) and 
Cheng Jianping (sent to a labor camp as a result of sending a tweet) (Wasserman 147). 
Prominent examples of this nature are increasingly capturing the attention of the 
international media, such as when Saudi journalist Hamza Kashgari was deported from 
Malaysia to Saudi Arabia to face trial and a possible death penalty as a result of Twitter 
posts he made about the Prophet Muhammad (Gooch). It may well be that strict 
authoritarian control over traditional discourse, social norms, and media only encourages 
citizens to embrace the Internet as new kind of public sphere and to view one another as 
members in a community of shared risks and values.  
 In the case of Saudi Arabia, the country has employed some of the strictest 
policies of Internet use and state censorship programs in the world. Partly as a result of 
initiatives, the country has thus far been spared Arab Spring-style popular uprisings. 
Nonetheless, social conditions and local issues have created a potential flashpoint for 
online activism — as The New York Times reported in June 2011, “Social media, which 
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helped drive protests across the Arab world, seems tailor-made for Saudi Arabia, where 
public gatherings are illegal, women are strictly forbidden to mix with unrelated men and 
people seldom mingle outside their family” (MacFarquhar). As a result, Saudi Arabia — 
a country which was once so Internet-alienated that a religious fatwa was issued against 
women typing “LOL (“laughing out loud”) while surfing the web — now features 
religious conservatives starting their own YouTube channels in an attempt to highlight 
the work of Wahhabist clerics (Ibid.).   
 Social Media is even being used to challenge some of the most sensitive and 
taboo socio-political issues in the country, including the sore subject of women’s rights. 
In May 2011 a Saudi women’s rights activist named Manal al-Sharif uploaded a 
YouTube video of herself driving a car in the city of Khobar (Foreign Policy). Despite 
attempts from Saudi authorities to block the video, it quickly became a viral sensation 
that encouraged dozens of other Saudi women to upload similar videos. Another Saudi 
online activist, Eman Al Nafjan, helped to spread the videos on her influential English-
language blog Saudiwoman’s Weblog — a platform she also used to call out Saudi 
authorities when they set up a fake Twitter feed to try to discredit al-Sharif (Ibid.). 
Similar creativity has also been on display in Bahrain, where activists have used Google 
Earth in order to “reveal the shocking size of lands expropriated by the royal family for 
private use” (Lynch 47). Social Media activism appears to be on the rise even in Arab 
countries where citizens have long been told that dissidence and protest are go against 
longstanding traditions of social harmony and deference to monarchies.  
 While the Arab Spring may have impressively showcased the more dramatic and 
extreme side of Social Media’s political applicability, examples of renewed online 
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activism in Russia and China during the same time period have also highlighted how 
Social Media can provide civil societies and social movements with more long-term types 
of utility. Unlike as in some of the Arab Spring countries, Social Media has not brought 
citizens in Russia and China to the streets to call for outright revolution or the total 
abolishment of the existing government.   
 This should not be taken to mean that civil societies in Russia and China have 
done less to embrace Web 2.0 tools than their counterparts in the Middle East, or that 
Social Media has failed to make a political impact in these two countries. On the 
contrary, the social movements and anti-authoritarian dissidents of these two nations have 
spent the last several years fostering close and blossoming relationships with Social 
Media platforms. Social Media’s political utility for voicing dissent and calling the 
government to account has only continued to expand, despite sophisticated attempts in 
both China and Russia to suppress online activism and to co-opt the public sphere carved 
out by new Social Media platforms. This demonstrates both Social Media’s flexibility in 
the face of state pressure as well as the long-term sustainability of reform movements that 
emerge out of online spaces.   
 Russia is an interesting environment for studying Social Media impact due to the 
variety of ways in which its citizens have used Web 2.0 tools to apply pressure on a 
government failing to deliver on needed reforms and to meet social needs. The Russian 
Communication and Press Ministry projected in 2011 that the country had 80 million 
regular Internet users, or around 56% of the total population (Razumovskaya). Leon 
Aron, the director of Russian studies at the American Enterprise Institute, argued in 
Spring 2011 that today’s Russia can be divided into the two categories of the “television 
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nation” and the “Internet nation”; “Although most Russians still get their daily news from 
television, the minority who rely on the Internet are more politically engaged….The 
Internet is already a major factor in Russian politics — and its influence is growing 
almost daily” (1). Writing even before the major protests that begun sprouting in Russia 
at the end of 2011, Aron noted, “The Internet is the backbone of civil society in Russia — 
giving people both a voice and the tools to self-organize — and it is a growing force 
against authoritarianism” (Ibid.). Young Russians are increasingly abandoning television 
altogether, causing notable figures like socialite-turned-activist Kseniya Sobcha to shift 
from their television roots towards a greater focus on Twitter and other Social Media 
outlets (Stanley). Paralleling a trend currently in progress in other authoritarian societies, 
in Russia the Internet has enabled citizens to access and discuss examples of 
governmental ineptitude or election fraud ignored by the subjugated, traditional media 
outlets (de Carbonnel). The influence of the Internet has been rapidly expanding in the 
country, marked at certain points by memorable acts of online activism on the parts of 
frustrated individuals.  
 In 2009 police officer Aleksei Dymovsky (now also known as the “YouTube 
Cop”) rocketed to national and international fame when he uploaded two online videos in 
which he detailed police corruption and appealed directly to Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin to address the widespread problem. In spite of Dymosky’s subsequent firing, 
harassment, and arrest, other Russians soon began sharing their own videotaped stories 
and pleas online (Weir; McDonald; RT; BBC, “Russian policeman”; Levy, “Videos 
Rouse”).  Florian Toepfl’s empirical study of the event led him to determine that the two 
“honest police Major Dymovskiy” videos produced a scandal that was, “perceived as a 
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major threat to the ruling elites” in Russia (Toepfl 1306).   
 In contrast to Dymovskiy’s refusal to endorse the government’s outreach efforts, 
the Kremlin was able to manage the “Living Shield” scandal that erupted in March 2010 
when 29-year-old Stanislav Sutygain uploaded a YouTube video describing how Moscow 
traffic police used him and several other bystanders to form an unwitting human shield by 
parking their cars across the road to stop an escaping criminal (Ibid 1306-9). In that case, 
top-down management succeeded in appeasing Sutygain and massaging public outrage 
by using superficial gestures; the chief of the Moscow traffic police gave the blogger a 
certificate of bravery and one radio station even proclaimed, “The reform of the ministry 
of Internal Affairs has been prepared by bloggers” (Ibid 1308). Since 2009 online videos 
have come to play an outsized role in exposing the Russian ruling party’s abuse of office 
and attacks on civil society, aided in large part by the rapid spread of new “smart phones” 
capable of instantly recording videos of misconduct on a moment’s notice (Schwirtz, “A 
New Kind of Election Monitor”). These cases would suggest that even sophisticated and 
pro-active regimes like the one in Russia are dependent to some degree on the 
compliance of online activists in efforts to limit damage to state legitimacy in the case of 
online scandals.  
 This implies a relative loss of control and leverage compared to the pre-Internet 
days during which information and credibility could be much more smoothly managed 
and piloted by the state. This can be discomforting to authoritarian elites long used to the 
traditional rules of the offline era. Even as Russia was overtaking Germany as Europe’s 
largest Internet market in 2010, Vladimir Putin famously dismissed online political 
activism by claiming that the Internet is just “50 percent pornographic material” (Barry, 
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“Resolute Putin”). A January 2012 Newsweek magazine article noted that Putin “regards 
the Internet with suspicion and knows as little about it as he can, taking obvious pride in 
the fact that he doesn’t even use a computer” (Nemtsova and Matthews 21). While the 
regime has had the foresight to co-opt and hire numerous Internet and new media experts, 
the ruling elites are themselves sometimes personally and culturally disconnected from 
their country’s young and educated netizens. When older figures in an authoritarian 
regime show open contempt for the Internet and its growing user-base, it undermines 
their own efforts to co-opt and charm these very same demographics into continuing their 
political apathy or compliance.  
 In addition to video-sharing trends, other online social movements have similarly 
served to rouse Russia’s civil society out of its long-dormant state. For example, the 
young “shareholder activist” and real estate lawyer Aleksei Navalny famously received a 
million unique online visitors per day on his blog when he published his scoop about 
embezzlement at the state-owned pipeline company Transneft. Navalny developed a large 
following via his LiveJournal blog and eventually established his own website at 
Navalny.ru, building on public as well as shareholder outrage at systematic corruption at 
public-private companies such as those in the Russian energy sector (Kramer). At the 
start of 2011 he launched another website named RosPil (“Russian Saw,” from the slang 
for kick-backs), which was based off of a two year-old initiative by President Medvedev 
to make all government documents of tender open to public scrutiny. Navalny has 
successfully mobilized thousands of volunteers to analyze and debate government 
requests for tender, the most outrageous of which are analyzed by experts and eventually 
even subjected to crippling letter campaigns by readers of Navalny’s site (Ioffe, “One 
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man’s cyber-crusade”). This sort of reader work- and risk-diffusion is a successful, 
political application of another type of Web 2.0 phenomenon known as “crowd 
sourcing”, in which thousands or tens of thousands of online visitors contribute 
individual work in order to achieve massive joint projects. A December 2011 issue of 
Foreign Policy magazine released in the same month included Navalny in its list of “100 
Top Global Thinkers” and noted that by fall 2011, “Navalny had saved the Russian 
government nearly 7.7 million rubles by calling attention to and then torpedoing wasteful 
deals, not to mention offering a mainstream face for the growing Russian anti-corruption 
movement” (60). The utility of tactics like crowd sourcing is practically limitless, 
meaning there is a high chance of seeing more of this kind of activity in the future in 
other authoritarian countries where the government is similarly viewed as corrupt and 
inefficient.  
 Russian online movements such as the one spearheaded by Navalny eventually 
succeeded in mobilizing to make their views felt in the real world. In December 2011 
historic protests broke out in Russia of the kind not seen in the country in two decades. 
Russia’s civil society — long since pronounced dead or in a permanent coma — turned 
out in force across Russia in order to protest the blatant rigging of the country’s 
parliamentary elections. As demonstrations continued to break out across several cities, 
The New York Times reported:   
The blogosphere has played a central role in mobilizing young 
Russians. During the parliamentary campaign, Russians using 
smartphones filmed authority figures cajoling or offering money to 
subordinates to get out the vote for United Russia. More video went 
online after Election Day, when many Russians in their 20s camped out 
in polling stations as amateur observers. (Barry, “Rally Defying Putin’s 
Party”). 
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 In the lead-up to the protests, Navalny had managed to successfully transfer his 
online visibility into a public leadership role among the segments of Russian society 
infuriated by the September 2011 announcement that Putin and Medvedev were once 
again switching seats with each other for the presidency (Panyushkin). After acquiring 
hundreds of thousands of online followers for his Internet projects over the course of the 
prior two years, Navalny was openly treated like a rock star at the public speeches he 
gave during the December protests (Parfitt). Labeling the demonstrations the “birth of 
Russian citizenry”, The Economist magazine noted that these protestors were “mobilized 
by social networks rather than political parties” and that Alexei Navalny had been a key 
figure in transforming online activism into street action and popular discourse; “Although 
Mr. Navalny is recognized by only 7% of the population, his [Internet-popularized] 
image of United Russia as a ‘party of crooks and thieves’ is now recognized by more than 
two-thirds” (“Birth of Russian citizenry”). A lengthy Time Magazine expose on Navalny 
in January 2011 centered largely on asking how and when he would supposedly run for 
the Russian presidency (Shuster).   
 Following up on their prior success just a few months earlier, four times as many 
Russians turned out to act as election observers in the March 2012 presidential election as 
in December (The Economist, “It brings a tear”). As a result, the regime was forced to use 
much more labor-intensive methods to rig the vote and had to abandon the blatant rigging 
tactics it used in the parliamentary elections (Ibid.). While the ruling party again simply 
denied all accusations and rejected the validity of incriminating videos posted online, it 
was still pushed into a much more defensive posture this time around after hundreds of 
thousands of Russians set up a vast network of Web cameras to monitor ballot boxes 
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(Kishkovsky and Barry). Despite the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church has grown 
“so close to the Kremlin that it often seems like a branch of government” (Schwirtz, 
“$30,000 Watch”), vibrant activity among the faithful on Social Media websites and 
online discussions boards even pressured the influential institution into publicly taking a 
stand in favor of election reform (Kishkovsky).  
 Journalist Konstantin von Eggert has noted that the Putin regime inadvertently 
laid the groundwork for these protests by providing the stability and economic 
development needed for the emergence of a new, technology-savvy Russian middle class 
that is now protesting against the government in major cities (von Eggert). Many modern 
authoritarian regimes thus find themselves in a devilish, catch-22 predicament — they are 
forced to maintain economic growth and access to technological modernization in order 
to sustain legitimacy and avoid public discontent, but these very same factors can 
ultimately serve as a foundation for the rise of new, Internet-savvy demographics.  
 The Chinese government currently finds itself in this exact dilemma. The 
country’s rapid economic development and wholesale embrace of technology have been 
accompanied by an unbelievable explosion of Social Media adoption. This has provided 
Chinese citizens with a tailor-made opportunity for new dimensions of civic engagement. 
Writing even before the latest waves of Internet activism that recently began in China, 
Xiang Zhou noted in 2009 that “[despite] the gap between the potential and the reality of 
the Internet…academia outside China still acknowledges that the Chinese people, by and 
large, do have more political freedom than before” (1006). Guobin Yang, an Associate 
Professor at Columbia University and an expert on Internet use in China, wrote an article 
in 2011 in which he noted: 
  
47 
Protest is also increasingly common on the Internet. I recently counted 60 
major cases of online activism, ranging from extensive blogging to heavily 
trafficked forums to petitions, in 2009 and 2010 alone. Yet these protests 
are reformist, not revolutionary. They are usually local, centering on 
corrupt government officials and specific injustices against Chinese 
citizens, and the participants in different movements do not connect with 
one another, because the government forbids broad-based coalitions for 
large-scale social movements. (“China’s Gradual Revolution”)  
 
 One reason online social networks have proliferated so rapidly and successfully in 
China and elsewhere is because the wide variety of Social Media tools and websites 
available allow citizens in different societies to adopt the particular platforms and 
programs most useful for their linguistic and social needs. University of Indiana Social 
Media scholar Shuo Tang has noted that the Chinese language is so succinct that most 
micro-blogging messages never even reach the 140-character limit typical for such 
platforms (The Economist, “Twtr”). The famous Chinese artist and activist Ai Weiwei 
commented in “Ai Weiwei's Blog”, a translated collection of his 2,700 online posts from 
2007-2009, that, “Twitter is most suitable for me. In the Chinese language, 140 
characters is a novella” (The Economist, “Ai Weiwei's blog”). Goubin Yang, the author 
of The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online, has argued that Chinese 
presents major hurdles for even the most sophisticated Social Media-monitoring 
software: “Many know how to use the versatility of the Chinese language to create 
characters that easily beat the best filtering technologies” (“Online Activism” 35). The 
unbelievable growth and popularity of micro-blogging platforms in China shows that 
even the most quick-footed and proactive Internet-controlling regimes face a constant 
battle in their attempts to carefully monitor and control the proliferation of Social Media 
platforms within their societies.  
 In contrast to most other authoritarian cases, in China the impact of Social Media 
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has been a field of serious scholarly attention since the Web 2.0 era first began in 2004-
2005. China scholars rapidly began pointing out the influence of blogs on foreign and 
domestic affairs and their utility as vehicles for political speech (Zhou, X. 1004). Yang 
has argued that growing Chinese Internet discourse is making an impact in the four 
distinct-but-overlapping areas of cultural, social, political, and nationalistic activism 
(Yang, “Online Activism” 33). Xiao Qiang has written that the turning point for Social 
Media impact in China can be explicitly traced, arguing in a 2011 article, “It was in 
2007…that the Internet first helped to propel certain happenings into the official media 
despite resistance from censors. By doing so, Internet activity effectively set the agenda 
for public discourse” (“The Battle” 48). The exploding effect of online activity on 
national discourse was not lost on authorities; a 2009 study by the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences analyzing the Internet’s impact even identified netizens as a “new 
opinion class” capable of swiftly influencing society (Xuegang, Jiangchun, and Huaxin).  
 This analysis is not universally accepted by China scholars; a 2011 empirical 
study examining behavioral and attitudinal factors by Yi Mou, David Atkin, and Hanlong 
Fu concluded, “Importantly, the current political and social environment in China seems 
to truncate any liberalizing potential of the Internet, as evidenced by the limited online 
political discussion and strong presence of government regulation” (341). In their 2011 
article, the authors particularly emphasized data that seemed to speak directly against the 
claims made by “Liberation Technology” optimists like Qiang; for example, they pointed 
to World Internet Project data from 2003, 2005, and 2007 showing that 50% of Chinese 
Internet users do not post their opinions at all, 30% do so sometimes, only 10% express 
their opinions frequently, and that the rate of political nonparticipation is “even higher 
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among the younger generation than in the overall population” (Mou, Atkin, and Fu 451; 
Shen et al.). These types of direct disagreements validate Stanley Rosen’s claim that the 
political impact of the Internet is quite possibly the most contested subject in Chinese 
communications research (Rosen 509).   
 However, scholars like Qiang argue that any apathy to Internet-based civic 
engagement will fade as the explosion of online social communication slowly bleeds into 
the political arena: “Although most posts are personal in nature, more and more bloggers 
are writing about public affairs and becoming local opinion leaders” (“The Battle” 49). 
Other scholars have also conducted their own empirical studies of speech diversity in 
Chinese Social Media platforms and concluded, “As critical citizenry, China’s netizens 
constitute a new social force challenging authoritarian rule” (Lei 291). Even some of the 
empirical work by Mou, Atkin, and Fu seemed to confirm this trend; while they argued 
that pre-existing political beliefs (rather than the technology itself) ultimately catalyzed 
online political engagement, they nonetheless found, “As citizens become more proficient 
with the Internet, they are more likely to engage in online political discussion” (352). 
This is very significant in light of the fact that “Chinese Internet users are active and 
prolific content producers. A January 2008 nationwide survey [showed] that about 66 
percent of China’s 210 million Internet users have contributed content to one or more 
sites” (Yang, “Online Activism” 35). Xiao Qiang has argued that Social Media websites 
have essentially transformed into a cultural phenomenon, providing a much-needed 
medium for exposing and sharing any kind of information that is normally not distributed 
in China’s highly-regulated society: 
In China, the nebulous nature of the Internet allows information not easily 
accessible elsewhere to be revealed (“shai”) … Netizens have launched 
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endless so-called shai activities on bulletin boards, blogs, and video- and 
photo-sharing services: For ‘shai salaries’, people post their own or 
others’ salaries for comparison; for ‘shai vacations’, users share vacation 
photos and experiences; and for ‘shai corruption’, ‘shai bosses’, and ‘shai 
riches’, netizens publish information and opinions about the elite that 
would otherwise go unsaid.  (“The Battle” 53).  
    
Taken in conjunction, these findings would certainly confirm that the rapid expansion of 
Chinese Internet use poses a major challenge to the regime’s desire to control political 
thought and social discourse.   
 Despite the latest wave of heavy arrests and repression of online dissidents that 
took place in the country across 2011, Chinese citizens continue to use the online tools 
available to them in order to constantly “push the envelope” on social issues and politics. 
Young Chinese bloggers have created and extensively promoted a cartoon symbol called 
“Grass Mud Horse,” whose conflict with river crabs in a mythical Chinese narrative feeds 
nicely into a play on words against Chinese censorship policy. The Grass Mud Horse first 
appeared in early 2009 in an online music video that become an Internet sensation almost 
immediately (Qiang, “The Song”). The grass mud horse has become “an icon of 
resistance to censorship,” as “the vast online population has joined the chorus, from 
serious scholars to usually politically pathetic urban white-collar workers” (Diamond 74). 
Such online movements have started to make themselves felt in the real world. Brave 
activists have started to daringly run as independents in low-level elections across the 
country by using popular micro-blogging websites to quickly generate popular support 
(LaFraniere; The Economist, “Vote as I say”). The regime has similarly been alarmed by 
the growing capacity of online social networks to mobilize real-world demonstrations as 
well as continuous home visits to prominent Chinese activists under house arrest (The 
Economist, “Blind man’s bluff”).   
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 In 2009 Rebecca MacKinnon noted that China’s blogosphere is a “much more 
freewheeling space than the mainstream media” in that the government’s censorship 
varied widely across the fifteen blog-service providers that she analyzed in her research 
(MacKinnon, “China’s Censorship 2.0”). As a result, Mackinnon concluded that “a great 
deal of politically sensitive material survives in the Chinese blogosphere, and chances for 
survival can likely be improved with knowledge and strategy” (Ibid.). She also 
highlighted the fact that China’s “ground-breaking manifesto — Charter 08, a call for 
nineteen reforms to achieve ‘liberties, democracy, and the rules of law’ in China — 
garnered most of its signatures through the aid of blog sites such as bullog.cn” (Ibid.). 
MacKinnon has called this development “networked authoritarianism”, a state in which 
“the single ruling party remains in control while a wide range of conversations about the 
country’s problems nonetheless occur on websites and social-networking services” 
(Mackinnon, “China’s ‘Networked Authoritarianism’” 33). Although some of China’s 
“netizens” (known officially as wangmin) are quickly squelched, those who gain enough 
popularity often enjoy some degree of protection because authorities become wary of the 
potential public backlash that could emerge as a result of subjecting these individuals to 
heavy-handed methods (Lei 291). Prominent examples include the author Li Chengpeng 
(who enjoys 3 million followers on his Sina Weibo account) and the celebrated racecar 
driver and blogger Han Han (whose personal blog has experienced hundreds of millions 
of visits to date) (China Digital Times; Time Magazine; Jacobs, “Heartthrob’s Blog”).  
 In recent years China has experienced a “micro-blogging revolution” in which the 
speed and size of micro-blogging social networks have bulldozed the government’s 
traditional policy of carefully crafting and filtering the news through state media outlets 
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(Wines and LaFraniere). Even the regime’s advanced censorship software and hordes of 
Internet police have been unable to keep up with the pace with which rumors, news, and 
outrage about breaking events can now spread across China. As a result, micro-blogs 
have become the default trend-setters of popular news and are increasingly influencing 
the content of widely-read Chinese-language news outlets published out of Hong Kong 
and America (The Economist, “Hidden News”). The waves of online outrage that 
typically follow in the wake of high-profile cases of governmental abuse or incompetence 
have become so influential that they have even sparked more hard-hitting and critical 
reporting at previously loyal state media outlets (Wines and Johnson). Likewise, the 
newfound power of popular Chinese authors and artists to circumvent state publishers 
and patronage systems by reaching audiences online has forced the market-minded 
government to tolerate not only increasingly incendiary artistic material, but even open 
criticisms of state censorship policy (Wong, “Pushing China’s Limits”). Similar market 
forces are currently at work in Myanmar, where the ruling junta’s desperation for 
economic development and integration with the outside world have led it to remove 
firewalls, restore access to Social Media websites, and host international technology 
conferences in the capital (The Economist, “Yangyon’s digital spring”).  
 Even some extremely organized and powerful authoritarian governments such as 
China’s are forced to carefully pick and choose when and how they clamp down on 
Social Media dissent. However, this should not be taken to mean that authoritarian 
regimes are defenseless in the face of growing online activism. As we shall see in the 
following section, most authoritarian regimes have been far from idle during the global 
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Web 2.0 explosion and several of them have even found creative ways to use the spread 
of Social Media platforms to further entrench their own holds on power. 
 IV. Authoritarian Regimes and Their Adjustments to Social Media Proliferation 
 
 
 Although the Arab Spring demonstrated that some repressive governments were 
clearly behind the times when it came to new developments such as Social Media, other 
authoritarian regimes clearly understand and recognize the potential consequences of 
information and communication technologies spreading freely within their societies. 
They have therefore responded to the creative socio-political applications of Social 
Media with an equally innovative variety of measures. Some governments have launched 
gargantuan efforts to limit the empowering potential of Social Media while still 
attempting to harness technological advancements in order to further entrench their own 
regimes.   
 Many authoritarian governments have been extremely open and pro-active in this 
regard, sometimes establishing enormous domestic systems that bear only minor 
resemblance to the Internet known and used by the rest of the world. China is well on its 
way to building its own entire Web 2.0, replacing the brands and websites used by the 
rest of the global with domestic search engines and companies run directly or almost 
directly by the government (Jiang; Zuckerman). New service disruptions in Iran at the 
start of 2012 led observers to suspect that the Iranian regime is finally moving ahead with 
plans to implement domestic “Halal” Intranet intended to replace access to the global 
Internet (Chenar). Russia and other countries have also followed suit (Morozov, “Is 
Google”; Fisher). Nations such as Cuba and Myanmar have attempted to artificially 
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hamper the growth of telecommunications infrastructure for fear of a free flow of 
information in and out of their countries (Worth; Morozov, “Cuba and Burma”). Several 
scholars have also noted the same trend in Iran, which has “impeded the spread of 
broadband access, fearing that it would further enable Iranians to access sensitive cultural 
and political material that might undermine the government’s control over terrestrial 
broadcasting and challenge both prevailing mores and the regime’s legitimacy” (Aday et 
al. 13). A number of organizations and experts have already attempted to compile various 
concrete rankings and categorizations for Internet control and repression. Reporters 
Without Borders, for example, has divided suspect countries into the two categories of 
“Internet Enemies” and “Countries Under Surveillance”: 
Fig. 9. Reporters Without Borders Internet Freedom Categories, April 2012 
(Reporters Without Borders) 
Internet Enemies Countries Under Surveillance 
 Bahrain 
 Belarus 
 Burma 
 China 
 Cuba 
 Iran 
 North Korea 
 Saudi Arabia 
 Syria 
 Turkmenistan 
 Uzbekistan 
 Vietnam 
 Australia  
 Egypt 
 Eritrea 
 France 
 India 
 Kazakhstan 
 Malaysia 
 Russia 
 South Korea 
 Thailand 
 Tunisia 
 Turkey 
 United Arab Emirates 
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Fig. 10. Reporters Without Borders Internet Censorship Rankings Map, 2009 (Warf) 
 
 
Similar rankings have been conducted by groups like the OpenNet Initiative (ONI), a 
partnership between Harvard University, the University of Toronto, and The SecDev 
Group corporation. ONI distinguishes between four different “Global Internet Filtering 
Maps” (Political, Social, Conflict/Security, Internet Tools). For comparison, here is the 
ONI political map:  
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Fig. 11. ONI Global Internet Filtering Map-Politics, 2011  
(OpenNet Initiative, “Global Filtering”) 
 
ONI has even developed an interactive online map showing the various levels of global 
filtering of Social Media, with toggles for Facebook, Flickr, Orkut, Twitter, and YouTube 
(OpenNet Initiative, “Social Media”).   
 However, while these sorts of rankings and quantitative systems provide some 
helpful background, I would like to emphasize that the main purpose of this thesis is not 
to single out any authoritarian country as the worst offender, nor is it to provide my own 
quantitative analysis on degrees of censorship. Rather, I aim to provide an overview of 
major events and cases from recent years to the reader, thereby extrapolating some 
common trends and key points regarding authoritarian responses to Social Media 
proliferation. For the purposes of this thesis, the label “authoritarian” will be used as an 
all-inclusive umbrella term for an entire spectrum of governments that more specialized 
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scholars have distinguished as ranging from “hybrid,” semi-authoritarian regimes such as 
Russia on one end to “classic” authoritarian regimes such as China and Myanmar on the 
other (Bogaards 2009).    
 A fierce debate has been raging for several years as various experts have 
proffered starkly contrasting conclusions and predictions regarding Social Media’s anti-
authoritarian potential (Open Society Foundation). Clay Shirky, Patrick Meier, and other 
academics have argued that the Web and Social Media are forces which represent a clear 
boon for dissidents and civil societies, essentially aiding in an inexorable march of 
freedom as authoritarian regimes struggle to deal with a free-flow of information and 
communication (Meier, “Digital Activism,” “Why Dictators”; Shirky, “The net 
advantage”). Overly optimistic predictions on the Internet’s ability to confound 
authoritarian regimes are nothing new. Bill Clinton once enthusiastically proclaimed that 
it would be impossible for China to build a giant firewall around its domestic Internet 
(Lagerkvist 120). In 2005, New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof happily 
announced, “It’s the Chinese leadership itself that is digging the Communist Party’s 
grave, by giving the Chinese people broadband” (“Death by a Thousand Blogs”). Today 
China’s citizens are far more active on the Internet than in 2005, yet the Communist Party 
certainly does not look like it will end up six-feet under any time soon.  
 Other scholars have openly voiced their deep reservations about these types of 
optimistic paradigms, arguing instead that the Internet simply hands police and 
authorities plenty of new opportunities for increasing social control (Lyon). Such 
skepticism has only grown in the face of inaccurate and overly-utopian commentaries 
from pundits, journalists, and politicians that imbue the Internet with almost miraculous 
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powers for democratization. Although the events of 2011 and 2012 have spoken to Social 
Media’s ability to galvanize civil societies, critics have continued to chide famously 
Internet-enthusiastic pundits like The Atlantic’s Andrew Sullivan and Foreign Policy’s 
Elizabeth Dickinson. For example, as Tunisian regime began to in 2011, Jilian C. York, 
Director of International Freedom of Expression at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
wrote a piece lamenting the widespread publication of knee-jerk, unsubstantiated articles 
attributing of success of such revolutions to sources like Wikileaks and Twitter even after 
similar judgments had turned out to be famously overblown and hasty in the case of Iran 
(York; Morozov, The Net Delusion).   
 In a similar vein, commentators like CNet’s Caroline McCarthy have worried that 
the growing fixation with Social Media will overshadow more important aspects of the 
narrative, such as the fact that revolutions are even taking place in the Arab world in the 
first place — in her words, “There’s no such thing as a ‘social media revolution’” 
(McCarthy). Widely-read journalist Malcom Gladwell wrote an essay for The New 
Yorker in October 2010 entitled “Small Change: Why the revolution will not be tweeted,” 
in which he went so far as to openly doubt that the relatively “weak” and often 
impersonal connections of the kind generated on Social Media networks would be 
enough to encourage protestors to engage in high-risk activism of the sort seen during the 
American Civil Rights movement.   
 Author and journalist Tina Rosenberg has likewise questioned the power of so-
called “Facebook Revolutions” by comparing these events to famous precedents like the 
1955 Montgomery bus boycott and arguing that the importance of personal connections 
still far outweighs any benefits derived from modern technology (Rosenberg). In 2010 
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Jeroen Van Laer and Peter Van Aelst published an article similarly claiming that “it 
seems that the new media are losing their newness quickly, and are fundamentally are 
unable to create stable ties between activists that are necessary for sustained collective 
action” (Van Laer  and Van Aelst 1146). These types of comments echo much of the 
academic literature from the early- and mid-2000s, during which time numerous scholars 
argued that the Internet is a “weak-tie instrument” incapable of generating the binding 
ties and strong trust between participants needed to create lasting social movements 
(Diani, “Social movement networks”). Even though world events in 2011 and 2012 may 
have invalidated some of these overly negative and pessimistic generalizations and 
assumptions, the various concerns that have been raised by skeptics should still be taken 
seriously in light of Social Media’s many intrinsic shortcomings.  
 While the Internet is a powerful force and Web 2.0 tools may be extremely 
flexible, these new technologies also contain dangerous pitfalls and limitations for any 
social movements hoping to embrace these mediums. Scholars have noted that new 
communication technologies like Social Media can “facilitate intergroup divisions” and 
“foster group polarization” (Haider 8). Others have also warned that these new 
technologies might make citizens and activists more passive by “leading them to confuse 
online rhetoric with substantial political action, diverting their attention away from 
productive activities” (Aday et al. 5). Even the very structure of Social Media-powered 
social movements is a two-edged sword; although so far the decentralized nature of these 
movements has often proven advantageous in that it makes them harder to suppress, the 
lack of clear leadership always represents a potential liability. Despite the eventual 
success of the uprising in Egypt, throughout the affair outside observers worried that the 
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consensual and intrinsically diffused nature of the Social Media-powered youth 
movement could lead to a major squabbles or communications failures — especially in 
the face of staunch resistance by a more hierarchical, organized, and unified authoritarian 
regime (Fahim and El-Naggar, “Some Fear”).   
 The problem of online decentralization applies to information as well as to 
leadership; damaging or counter-productive rumors can spread chaos during key 
moments such as street demonstrations. Combined with the Internet’s ability to provide 
anonymity, this means that government agents or sympathizers can create fake dissident 
accounts on social networking sites in order to send conflicting messages or in order to 
infiltrate the leadership structures that are emerging in newly organized civil societies. 
Even if these saboteurs are discovered before they manage to actively wreck any harm, 
such revelations could in and of themselves lead to demoralization or overt paranoia 
among activists and organizers.  
 Authoritarian regimes do not even have to be involved in order for such setbacks 
to occur — idle chatter or even well-meaning do-gooders are perfectly capable of dealing 
exactly this sort of damage. Saeedeh Pouraghayi, an Iranian dissident whose supposed 
murder and rape by the government was reported and quickly disseminated online, was 
widely hailed as a Green Movement martyr until the whole story turned out to be a hoax 
several months later (Esfandiari, “The Twitter Devolution”). In 2011 the world media and 
Syrian diaspora were captivated by the blog posts of a young American-Syrian activist 
operating under the moniker “Gay Girl in Damascus,” who wrote intimately about her 
government’s brutal crackdown on Arab Spring protestors. After several months panic 
ensued when her cousin updated her blog to say that the popular activist had been 
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disappeared by Assad’s forces, even prompting a State Department investigation. After a 
few weeks, the world suddenly learned that Gay Girl in Damascus was, in fact, a portly 
40-year-old American man from Georgia who admitted to fabricating months of journal 
posts for the purpose of raising awareness about the conflict (Flock and Bell). Civil 
society’s embrace of Social Media has proven to be a messy art at best, justifying at least 
some of the concerns raised by skeptics about these new, complex technologies 
backfiring on dissidents.  
 Internet-skepticism has perhaps been the most publicly championed by journalist 
and visiting Stanford scholar Evgeny Morozov ( “How dictators,” “How the net,” “Why 
the Internet is failing”). A disillusioned, former NGO-sponsored online activist in his 
native land of Belarus, Morozov has spent the last several years launching a veritable 
crusade of blog posts and public lectures to prevent the spread of two cardinal sins he 
calls “cyber-utopianism” (a naïve belief that the Internet is always good and has no 
downsides) and “Internet-centrism” (the idea that all democracy promotion should be 
framed in terms of the Internet). He consolidated his arguments and evidence in the 
publication of his first book, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, just 
released at the beginning of January 2011. The Net Delusion and other publications like it 
serve as a sobering and comprehensive counterpoint to the one-sided enthusiasm of 
Social Media’s unequivocal advocates. 
 One of the most thought-provoking points raised in Morozov’s book concerns the 
continuing pervasiveness of two competing 20
th
 visions of authoritarianism and how 
these paradigms have been applied in the digital age. In his book 1984, George Orwell 
emphasized the totalitarian dimensions of constant surveillance, finely honed 
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propaganda, and direct “Big Brother” control that were characteristic of Stalin-style 
regimes. In contrast, Aldous Huxley believed that ruling oligarchies would find easier 
and more insidious methods of social control based on taking advantage of humanity’s 
selfish desires and propensity to be easily distracted. In Huxley’s Brave New World, 
technology and science served to maximize pleasure and consumption, creating brain-
dead and complacent masses heady with sexual fulfillment and general hedonism. 
Morozov not only demonstrates that the spread of the Internet is capable of super-
charging a government’s pursuit of either approach, but also points out that smart regimes 
are increasingly using the growth of the Web to apply both styles of authoritarianism 
simultaneously — essentially creating a perfect storm of social control where minimal 
resources are applied with maximal efficiency.  
 It is easy to see why fears of Orwellian oppression might seem valid in an age 
where increasing numbers of citizens are constantly logging online to share their personal 
information and opinions. Many authoritarian governments have adopted sophisticated 
technological architectures in order to censor and control online activity. These range 
from Cuba’s crude-but-effective domestic programs to efforts in Russia to use Western 
companies and software to crack down on activists and civil society groups (Voeux and 
Pain; Morozov, “Tweeting your way”; Levy, “Russia Uses Microsoft”, “Microsoft 
Changes Policy”). Of course, the most advanced (and extensively analyzed) national 
program is China’s breathtakingly Orwellian “Project Golden Shield,” a.k.a. “The Great 
Firewall of China” (Zittrain and Edelman). Cutting-edge automated technology, tens of 
thousands of active censors, and countless Web portal employees are constantly at work 
filtering any discussions directly or indirectly critical of the government…often followed 
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by the intimidation, arrests, or disappearing of the offending parties (Wong, “Nobel 
Prize”; Wikipedia). Larry Diamond noted in 2006 that the Chinese government is also 
now “trying to eliminate anonymous communication and networking by requiring 
registration of real names to blog or comment and by tightly controlling and monitoring 
cybercafés” (74).   
 Most authoritarian countries are able to exercise such high levels of control over 
domestic Internet use as a result of state monopolies over telecommunications 
infrastructure. As Ronald Deibert and Rafal Dohozinski have noted, “While there is no 
official acknowledgement that service is being curtailed, it is noteworthy that the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard owns the main ISP in Iran — the Telecommunication Company of 
Iran (TCI)” (“Liberation Vs. Control” 51). The TCI handles all Internet traffic for the 
nation and is said by experts to have a filtering and blocking architecture second only to 
China’s (Dayem; Bray, “Activists utilizing Twitter”). Iran plans to have cyber-police 
units in all police stations across the country by mid-2012, and the first units are already 
active in Tehran (Associated Press, “Iran announces”). In March 2012, Pakistan stirred 
up both domestic and international controversy by openly and unapologetically soliciting 
companies to develop an advanced $10 million Internet censorship architecture for the 
entire country (Pfanner).   
 China has even attempted to implement programs that individually monitor every 
single computer user in China. In May 2009, the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT) decreed that every computer sold in China now needed to come with 
the new “Green Dam Youth Escort” program pre-installed. MIIT was eventually forced 
to back down from this decree last minute, as “While Green Dam was ostensibly aimed at 
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protecting children from inappropriate content, researchers outside and within China 
quickly discovered that it not only censored political and religious content but also 
logged user activity and sent this information back to a central computer server” 
(MacKinnon, “China’s ‘Networked Authoritarianism’” 39). The Chinese government has 
since instead implemented other measures, such as new regulations being tested in 
Beijing that would force bars, restaurants, hotels, and bookstores to install elaborate 
software for monitoring and identifying their otherwise-anonymous customers (Jacobs, 
“China Steps Up”).  
 Of course, sophisticated tactics and programs can also always be supplemented by 
good old-fashioned totalitarian arm-twisting. Iranians living abroad who criticize the 
current regime on Facebook or Twitter are have been threatened by violence and by the 
possibility of having their relatives still living in the country arrested (Fassihi). After 
several Belarusian dissidents began organizing a self-styled “Revolution Through Social 
Networks” in their country, the regime responded by attacking and threatening young 
activists in order to force them to spy on the movement’s founders (The Economist, 
“How to Dupe the KGB”). Sometimes authoritarian regimes with sufficient 
organizational capacity and a willingness to be aggressive can pre-empt even the speed 
with which Social Media can mobilize civil societies, given the correct combination of 
heavy-handed tactics. China responded to growing calls on micro-blogging sites for a 
“Jasmine Revolution” emulating the Arab Spring by combining digital censorship and 
surveillance with highly effective real-world police mobilizations, detentions, and house 
arrests (Jacobs, “Chinese Government Responds”).  
 While the emergence of the Internet has allowed authoritarian governments to 
  
66 
track the digital footprints of its citizens for years, the era of Web 2.0 social networking 
sites has provided it with rich new opportunities for surveillance and for pre-empting 
potential social flashpoints. Morozov dedicated an entire chapter in The Net Delusion to 
just this topic, arguing that Social Media sites make it easier for authoritarian regimes to 
track not only individual activists, but even allows them to study how dissident networks 
in their countries form in the first place (see Chapter Six: “Why the KGB Wants You to 
Join Facebook”). As summarized in an interview in January 2011:  
The reason why the KGB wants you to join Facebook is because it allows 
them to, first of all, learn more about you from afar. I mean, they don't 
have to come and interrogate you, and obviously you disclose quite a bit. 
It allows them to identify certain social graphs and social connections 
between activists. Many of these relationships are now self-disclosed by 
activists, by joining various groups. You can actually go and see which 
causes are more popular than others. (Radio Free Europe) 
 
 The “Blogs and Bullets” case study of Iran similarly concluded, “Although there 
is reason to believe the Iranian case exposes the potential benefits of new media, other 
evidence — such as the Iranian regime’s use of the same social network tools to harass, 
identify, and imprison protesters — suggests that, like any media, the Internet is not a 
‘magic bullet.’ At best, it may be a ‘rusty bullet’” (Aday et al. 3). In fact, some 
authoritarian regimes are now actually actively encouraging their citizens to sign up on 
popular Social Media websites. In early February 2011, the Syrian regime suddenly lifted 
a three-year access block on Facebook and YouTube, a move which led human rights 
organizations and the U.S. State Department to publicly question whether it was simply a 
ploy to track, identify, and attack outspoken citizens before popular unrest could spill into 
the streets (Preston, “Syria Restores Access”). As it turned out, just a few months after 
lifting these bans the Syrian regime began a country-wide campaign to arrest and beat 
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suspected dissidents until they handed over their Facebook passwords to the government. 
Once they had access to a citizen’s Facebook account, state security officers then took 
control of the person’s profile and manipulated it to spread pro-government comments 
(Preston, “Seeking to Disrupt”).   
 Authoritarian governments have become more creative in their attempts to 
impress themselves psychologically on Internet-users; in China, “since 2007 two cartoon 
characters, Jingjing and Chacha (from jingcha, the Chinese word for police), have 
popped up on Internet users’ screens to provide links to the Internet Police section of the 
Public Security website, where readers can report illegal information” (Qiang, “The 
Battle” 51). As one police officer from Shenzhen explained, “The main function of 
Jingjing and Chacha is to intimidate, not to answer questions” (Ibid.). The effectiveness 
of such tactics is debatable. An empirical analysis of Chinese online activity by several 
otherwise Internet-skeptical scholars found, “Interestingly, political intimidation in the 
form of the human flesh search engine and the 50-cent party does not seem to have a 
direct influence on online political discussion” (Mou, Fu, and Atkin 352). Of course, 
authoritarian governments always have the recourse of simply targeting the website 
operators themselves; in early 2011the government-affiliated China Internet Network 
Information Center (CNNIC) announced that anyone wanting to register a domain name 
with the popular “.cn” URL would have to register in person and submit a photo, thereby 
elimination anonymous .cn domain-name registration and making it, “easier for 
authorities to warn or intimidate website operators when ‘objectionable’ content appears” 
(MacKinnon, “China’s ‘Networked Authoritarianism’” 40).  
 When intimidation and pre-emptive arrests fail, modern authoritarian regimes 
  
68 
have also shown themselves capable and willing to employ far more drastic measures to 
prevent the continuation of online activism. The growing popularity and success of Social 
Media networks in China — combined with the events of the Arab Spring — so alarmed 
the Chinese Communist Party that in October 2011, it announced a campaign to 
implement some of the most restrictive measures on social networking sites and text 
messaging in years (Wong, Wines, and LaFraniere). Two months later, the government 
announced in December that it was launching yet another massive initiative to quash 
what it labeled as 2011’s new epidemic of online “rumors” — an undefined term widely 
understood to mean any news topic that could pose embarrassment or political difficulties 
for the regime (Bandurksi, “Rumor Fever,” “Control”). However, even these measures 
ultimately proved insufficient in stemming Social Media’s take-over of the public 
discourse. In March 2012, after social networking sites defied governmental attempts to 
keep the lid on a scandal involving a top Communist Party official and the ensuing party 
power struggle, rumors began swirling on micro-blogging sites that a coup was underway 
in Beijing and that military vehicles had been seen entering the capital. Afraid of losing 
control of this ongoing political crisis, the Chinese government responded by detaining 
six people, closing sixteen websites, and disabling user comments on two micro-blogging 
websites that together had more than 600 million registered accounts (Johnson).    
 In worst-case scenarios, authoritarian governments and their allies can typically 
rely on the fact that they control the entirety of a country’s Internet and 
telecommunications infrastructure. This allows them to shut down access to selective 
Web 2.0 platforms or even the entire Internet during periods of great civil unrest. As 
demonstrations got underway in Bahrain in February 2011, the government responded by 
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suddenly blocking websites like Bambuser and YouTube (Glanz). Egypt also initially 
reacted to youth-organized protests by blocking specific Social Media programs and 
Twitter in particular (Fahim and El-Naggar, “Violent Clashes”). As the unrest grew 
worse and the crowds swelled, the government eventually even managed to turn off the 
Internet entirely for five whole days — a feat which shocked people both in- and outside 
of the country and which raised fears about similar opportunities for other authoritarian 
governments in the Arab world:   
Interviews with many [Egyptian] engineers, as well as an examination of 
data collected around the world during the blackout, indicate that the 
government exploited a devastating combination of vulnerabilities in the 
national infrastructure. For all the Internet’s vaunted connectivity, the 
Egyptian government commanded powerful instruments of control: it 
owns the pipelines that carry information across the country and out into 
the world. Internet experts say similar arrangements are more common in 
authoritarian countries than is generally recognized. In Syria, for example, 
the Syrian Telecommunications Establishment dominates the 
infrastructure, and the bulk of the international traffic flows through a 
single pipeline to Cyprus. Jordan, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and other 
Middle Eastern countries have the same sort of dominant, state-controlled 
carrier. (Markoff and Glanz, “Egypt Leaders”)   
 
Less than a month after Egypt’s so-called “unprecedented” and “historical” move of 
taking the entire Internet down for several days, Libya followed suit by shutting down 
access to Facebook, Twitter, Al Jazeera, and eventually all national Internet connections 
in the country (Cowie; The Huffington Post).   
 Commenting in the shocked wake of the Internet going down in Egypt and Libya, 
many journalists and analysts forgot (or simply did not know) that such an extreme 
approach had already been previously applied by governments in Asia, most notably 
Myanmar in 2007 and Nepal in 2005 (Richtel). After ethnic riots in 2009, the Chinese 
province of Xinjiang was also cut off from the entire Internet for six whole months, along 
  
70 
with most types of mobile-phone and telephone services (MacKinnon, “China’s 
‘Networked Authoritarianism’” 40). However, Egypt’s shutdown was truly 
unprecedented simply in that it showcased how vulnerable even large and well developed 
Internet infrastructures can be; the Egyptian shut-down was a “double knockout” that not 
only cut the country off from the global Internet, but also left its domestic systems in a 
mess after Egypt’s internal Internet turned out to be fundamentally dependent “on 
moment-to-moment information from systems that exist only outside the country” 
(Markoff). This is particular ominous considering that in many authoritarian countries 
Internet service providers are typically obligated to shut down at the government’s whim 
as a result of licensing agreements that they are forced to sign in order to operate legally 
(Ibid).    
 The successful shutdown of the Internet in these states validated predictions made 
early on by information and communications analysts, such as a 2006 warning by R. 
Kelly Garrett that, “Increasing reliance on ICTs in contentious activity also poses a risk 
for social movements…In many cases, elites and their allies own and/or control the 
infrastructure on which new ICTs depend” (210). Even in authoritarian countries where a 
“kill switch” has never been flipped, such a move remains a distinct possibility since 
many of these nations feature a relatively small number of Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) whose network interconnections are concentrated in one central hub in the capital 
city (van Beijnum).   
 However, as the Egyptian example also demonstrated, in not every authoritarian 
country does this sort of infrastructure-based muscle-flexing work as intended. A New 
York Times article in February 2011 quoted one Egyptian protestor as saying, “Frankly, I 
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didn’t participate in Jan. 25 protests, but the Web sites’ blockade and communications 
blackout on Jan. 28 was one of the main reasons I, and many others, were pushed to the 
streets” (Cohen, N.) Celebrated Egyptian activist Wael Ghonim has similarly argued that 
Mubarak’s Internet shut-down backfired because it 1) emboldened the whole country by 
showcasing how scared the regime had become and 2) forced people to physically come 
out into the streets in order to obtain news and information (The Economist, “Revolution 
2.0”). Tampering with the Internet to shut down civil societies and prevent mobilizations 
is a cat-and-mouse game that is often on the razor’s edge, a gamble that helped the 
Iranian government in 2009 but turned out to be counter-productive for the Egyptian 
regime.   
 Government suppression of Social Media-powered political activism is not 
necessarily limited to such direct and obviously sinister manipulations as completely 
blocking popular websites, brazenly turning off the entire Internet, or beating activists. 
Some scholars have warned that authoritarian regimes might reap limited benefits from 
the occasional public outcry or venting on Social Media networks, as these allow the 
governments of countries like Russia or China to head off particularly galling cases of 
corruption or repression — thereby not only preventing social unrest, but further 
enhancing the domestic “legitimacy” of these regimes (Aron 5; Zhou, X. 1017). Florian 
Toepfl noted in a 2011 article that even though “some of the most heavily discussed 
phenomena in contemporary semi-authoritarian Russia are scandals emanating from the 
new, vibrant sphere of Social Media,” Russia’s ruling elites have proven themselves 
“very much capable of managing these outbursts of public outrage” (1301). There are 
also worries that authoritarian regimes are increasingly using the consumer- and 
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entertainment-based applications of Social Media to “buy off” their citizenry, trading 
comfort in exchange for preserving the status quo of truncated political freedoms. As The 
Economist pointed out in March 2010:    
It is true that the Internet can provide an outlet for political expression for 
people living under repressive regimes. But those regimes are also likely 
to monitor the Internet closely. And in some cases there is, in effect, a new 
social contract: do what you like online, as long as you steer clear of 
politics. Government-controlled Internet-access providers in Belarus, for 
example, provide servers full of pirated material to keep their customers 
happy. (The Economist, “The net generation”) 
These seem to be modern-day manifestations of the kind of authoritarian regimes Huxley 
feared, where political apathy is actively cultivated among the population by the state’s 
provision of consumerism and hedonism. The fact that sixty to seventy million people in 
China are deeply immersed in playing online games with one another certainly does not 
cause anyone in the country’s politburo to lose sleep at night (Lee).   
 China and Russia provide excellent case studies for examining the contrasting 
digital approaches taken by authoritarian states of the kind Orwell and Huxley 
envisioned, and the two nations have recently even begun to exemplify Morozov’s point 
that clever regimes can mix and match these two philosophies. Both countries 
demonstrate this ongoing process on a massive scale. China has by far the greatest total 
number of online-active “netizens” in the world; Russians spend more than double the 
world average amount of time per visitor on social networking sites (Reuters; Ioffe, 
“Facebook’s Russian Campaign”). For the governments of both countries, this has 
necessitated a carefully-tailored approach to social control where national policies 
towards domestic Internet usage are customized cleverly enough so that the desires of 
citizens are largely met while simultaneously mitigating the possibility of political 
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challenges emerging online.   
 Although the approaches taken by China and Russia represent strategies that seem 
like polar opposites, the goals are largely the same — accommodate individual desires, 
provide controlled environments for the release of political “steam” that thus fails to 
materialize as real-world action, and enable Internet use for non-political self-
advancement by corporations and individuals. Many Russians spend so much time 
communicating on social networking sites not because they want to organize politically, 
but rather because these websites digitize the long-standing national tradition — critically 
important during the Soviet era — of getting ahead personally and professionally 
primarily through personal contacts and networking (Ioffe, “Facebook’s Russian 
Campaign”).    
 Russia’s heavy Internet use long represented a boon for the government even 
though the relative freedom allowed in Russian online discourse stood in contrast to 
direct state invention on public shows of dissent and in the traditional media (Morozov, 
The Net Delusion). As Rebecca MacKinnon put it in early 2011, the Russian Ru.net is 
“on the cutting edge of techniques aimed to control online speech with little or no direct 
filtering” (“China’s ‘Networked Authoritarianism’” 43). Russia represents the most 
advanced model of a Huxleyan, hedonistic-minded strategy for authoritarian Internet 
management. The government has adeptly recruited talented and shrewd young 
technophiles to its cause, filling RuNet (Russia’s version of a domestic Internet) with a 
potent combination of distracting entertainment and pro-United Russia propaganda. This 
ranges from semi-pornographic endeavors like “The Tits Show” by Russia.ru (a 
professional production venture with direct connections to the Kremlin and elected 
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United Russia officials) to constant waves of humorous videos uploaded to Ru-Tube 
(Russia’s version of YouTube, owned by the state energy monopoly Gazprom).   
 After the online opposition to Russia’s ruling party grew increasingly vocal in the 
course of 2011, a new group called “Putin’s Army” suddenly appeared on Social Media 
sites and began uploading videos of attractive young women flaunting themselves in 
scant clothing to show support for Putin (The Economist, “It’s all in Putin’s head”). 
Putin’s Army ultimately claimed to be a grass-roots organization of “beautiful, smart 
young women” who just happened to be highly tech-savvy and capable of producing 
sophisticated media campaigns (Ioffe, “Taking It Off”).  One now-infamous Putin’s 
Army video centered on a young, buxom member named Diana, who scrawled “Porvu za 
Putina” (“I’ll tear it up for Putin”) across a white tank top…a tank top she then promptly 
proceeded to rip off of her ample chest in order to encourage viewers to upload similar 
pro-Putin viral videos (Ibid.).  
Fig. 12. Putin’s Army YouTube Video (Ibid.) 
 
 By promoting these types of consumerist or hedonistic projects, Russia’s 
government has attempted to take advantage of what Pippa Norris has called the 
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“democratic divide” between the Internet users who use the Internet for political aims and 
those who use it exclusively for personal, financial, pornographic, or entertainment 
purposes (Norris). The ruling party in Russia has a built-in advantage in pursuing this 
tactic; users typically tend to use the Internet more for non-political purposes than for 
political aims. In 2009 the Center for Information and Society issued a working paper on 
the global spread of ICTs that concluded that public access such as computer labs are 
“used primarily to meet personal and social needs…This is not to say that economic, 
political, and other such services are not patronized; only that their use is outstripped by 
personal and social activities” (8). With the majority of the population spending their 
time online engaged in personal pursuits and self-indulgence, it becomes much easier for 
the state to locate and control any remaining political content.   
 Evgeny Morozov has written about Russia’s efforts to steer the content of 
Russia’s blogosphere, including a project to “create a ‘Bloggers' Chamber’ — something 
akin to Russia's Public Chamber, Kremlin's attempt to tame and co-opt Russian 
intelligentsia — but this time geared for taming and co-opting RuNet” (Ninenko; 
Morozov, “Does Silicon Valley’s new favorite,” “Kremlin no longer hides”, “Russia may 
soon create”). This type of approach has been so creative that even China, the world 
leader in direct state control of the Internet, is now studying these sorts of subtler 
methods:   
China is looking to Russia, which may have invented an entirely new model of 
controlling the Internet without recourse to censorship. Having established full 
control of traditional media, the Kremlin is now moving full-speed into the virtual 
world. The authorities’ strategy is not new: establish tight control over the leading 
publishing platforms and fill them with propaganda and spin to shape online 
public opinion” (Morozov and MacKinnon)  
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In February 2012 the Russian wing of the international hacker-activist network 
Anonymous released e-mails hacked from the leaders of pro-Kremlin youth groups, 
including the Federal Youth Agency. The e-mails listed prices and payments offered to 
bloggers and journalists to praise Putin and attack his critics, complete with suggested 
tactics like flooding comments on websites and creating video cartoons comparing online 
activist Aleksei Navalny to Hitler (The Economist, “Nashi exposed”).  
 There are also fears that this authoritarian exchange of tactics between Russia and 
China may move in the opposite direction as the Kremlin becomes increasingly tempted 
to experiment with a Chinese-inspired style of more direct Internet censoring and filtering 
(Morozov, “Is Internet censorship,” “Russia considers”). In April 2011, the 
communications and special-information head of the FSB (the KGB’s successor) even 
stated that the agency would officially recommend that the government ban Skype, 
Hotmail, and Gmail as “Uncontrolled usage of these services may lead to massive threat 
to Russia's security” (The Telegraph). Although these revealing comments were quickly 
disavowed by the Kremlin, they display the nervousness and back-and-forth at play even 
inside relatively entrenched regimes as they weigh the levers of Huxley versus Orwell in 
the pursuit of repressing digital activism.  
 Autocratic regimes are perfectly capable of entering the Internet’s public sphere 
and distorting the communities and discussions that take place on Social Media 
platforms. With vast state resources and long-standing expertise at manipulating public 
opinion at their disposal, such governments certainly possess the ability to covertly flood 
Social Media websites with their own propaganda. One scholar warned early on in 2006 
that the Chinese government was “deliberately taking the initiative to occupy 
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cyberspace” and moving to transform the Internet into an echo chamber that only 
promotes state-approved views and ideologies (Zhou, Y. 146).  China’s ruling party 
actually pays tens of thousands of people to constantly surf China’s domestic Internet and 
flood social networking sites with fake pro-government posts. This has given the Chinese 
Communist Party the nickname “The 50-Cent Party,” for how much hired guns are 
supposedly paid by the regime for each fake pro-government post (Shane). In 2008 a 
Hong-Kong based researcher named David Bandurksi determined that the actual “50-
Cent Party” of propaganda agents consisted of at least 280,000 hired employees at 
various levels of government — not counting similar work done by volunteers such as 
retired officials or Communist Youth League members (MacKinnon, “China’s 
‘Networked Authoritarianism’” 41).   
 Even authoritarian regimes with far less resources and expertise than those of 
China’s are moving aggressively into Web 2.0 spaces. Hugo Chavez has hired 200 people 
to manage his Twitter account and has become Venezuela’s “Top Tweeter” in order to 
fight the “online conspiracy” of his opponents, despite once decrying the micro-blogging 
site as a “tool of terror” (Elliott; Dybwad; Chubb; Carroll). Some have called Fidel 
Castro “Cuba’s Supreme Blogger” due his regime’s enthusiasm for publishing his 
opinion pieces on state-owned blogs and because of the Cuba Informatics University’s 
so-called “Operation Truth” directive to produce disguised, state-owned blogs to counter 
anti-government material online (Hoffman 21). As these examples demonstrate, the 
communication potential of Social Media to spread political messages is often just as rich 
for authoritarian governments as it is for dissidents and reformers.  
 There is major misconception rampant among some over-enthusiastic pundits and 
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policy-makers that somehow only the reform-minded citizens of authoritarian nations 
have embraced Social Media. In many such countries, small cores of ethnic, religious, 
military, corporate, or other kinds of constituencies have heavily invested in the regime 
and will fight fiercely to maintain the oppressive status quo. In the case of Syria a pro-
Assad “Syrian Electronic Army” has emerged, whose 60,000-member Facebook page 
gave instructions on how to launch online attacks on dissidents and human rights activists 
(Facebook has since deleted the page) (Preston, “Syria Restores Access”). As Evgeny 
Morozov repeatedly points out throughout The Net Delusion, the nationalism fanned by 
many authoritarian governments in the 20
th
 century has translated quite well as a tactic 
for the 21
st
. Authoritarian propaganda machines can exploit sentiments like nationalism, 
religious fervor, or a fear of outside forces as pretexts for repressing online communities. 
Laws against blasphemy, national embarrassment, defamation, and the dissemination of 
“false information” have also been used to take legal action against Social Media 
platforms and social networking users in countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Lebanon, 
and Venezuela (Rohozinski and Deibert, “Liberation Vs. Control” 50-1).   
 In Libya, even some Web-savvy youths have sympathized with the government’s 
decision to eviscerate Internet access as “people were putting up bad things about Libya” 
— in effect fully buying into the nationalistic propaganda that online criticisms of the 
regime equate to anti-patriotic attacks on the country itself (Kirkpatrick, D., “In Libya”). 
The assumption that all of a country’s Internet-centric citizens want an empowered civil 
society and shift away from autocracy is unfortunately too idealistic. Nationalist hackers 
in Russia and China (but also in places like Saudi Arabia and Belarus) routinely attack 
foreign and domestic critics, bloggers, and activists. The methods range from the 
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extremely sophisticated to mundane-but-effective DDoS (Distributed-Denial-of-Service) 
attacks, in which websites are taken offline again and again as their hosting services are 
overwhelmed with fake Internet traffic.   
 Repressive governments and their proxies have also made use of a technique 
called “just-in-time blocking,” in which key Internet services or websites frequented by 
the opposition are disabled or attacked only at crucial times (such as during protests or 
right before elections). Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski have remarked that just-in-
time blocking, “may be the most effective tool for influencing political outcomes in 
cyberspace” and that, “The attraction of just-in-time blocking is that information is 
disabled only at key moments, thus avoiding the charges of Internet censorship and 
allowing for plausible denial by the perpetrators” (Rohozinski and Deibert, “Liberation 
Vs. Control” 53). The OpenNet Initiative has empirically documented this strategy at 
work in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and numerous other countries (Ibid.).   
 After the widely condemned December 2010 elections in Belarus, the government 
actively stepped in to head off any political mobilization that could have been organized 
through Social Media. The regime succeeded in forcing the popular Facebook-copycat 
site Vkontakte to delete a 120,000-strong opposition group called “We stand for great 
Belarus,” which had already posted an online event for a planned “Millions March” 
demonstration with over 40,000 sign-ups (Ostroumova). In China, as the 20
th
 anniversary 
of Tiananmen Square approached in 2009, “the government temporarily shut down 
countless websites — including Facebook, Twitter, and Wikipedia — ostensibly for 
‘technical maintenance” (Qiang, “The Battle” 51). During the December 2011 Russian 
parliamentary elections, the popular Social Media platform LiveJournal and the website 
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of the election-monitoring organization Golos were likewise brought down by massive-
cyber attacks (The Economist, “Losing their grip”). Iranians were once again cut off from 
the Internet in the run-up to the February 2012 parliamentary elections (Electron Libre). 
Just-in-time blocking, online surveillance systems, denial-of-service attacks, and other 
techniques used by authoritarian regimes and their proxies are often particularly 
successful because “many civil society organizations lack simple training and resources, 
leaving them vulnerable to even the most basic Internet attacks” (Rohozinski and Deibert, 
“Liberation Vs. Control” 54). Authoritarian regimes clearly have a variety of 
technological options available for dealing with the development of an online public 
sphere.  
 In the worst-case scenario, authoritarian regimes also have one last, obvious 
response to Social Media activism: simply ignoring it. Some repressive governments are 
entrenched enough that they can shrug off any pressure that Social Media may generate 
inside or outside of the country. While YouTube and Twitter may have galvanized 
Iranians to defy the government and solicited widespread global sympathy for the Green 
Movement, the theocratic-militaristic regime ultimately crushed the protests through 
brute force, abductions, arrests, torture, censorship, and a general apathy regarding 
international outcries. One empirical study of the Green Movement protests found that, 
despite online media’s success in calling the world’s attention to the events in Iran, 
outside actors’ lack of leverage meant that “there was little prospect of any short-term 
‘boomerang effect’” by which ordinary Iranians could solicit these actors for concrete 
assistance (Aday et al. 25). This led the authors to conclude that “Absent a ‘boomerang 
effect’ feedback loop, or some other meaningful mechanism, information dissemination 
  
81 
to the outside world is insufficient to affect significant domestic change” (Ibid. 27). Syria 
currently seems to be on the path of confirming this finding by repeating the Iranian 
scenario.   
 While the horrifying videos of the Assad regime’s crackdown are being 
successfully smuggled to a global audience through Social Media, this 
transnationalization has amounted to little in the face of the regime’s willingness to 
endure getting kicked out of the Arab League, being condemned at the U.N. General 
Assembly, losing the support of Hamas, and turning into an international pariah state. 
This parallels the pre-Internet experience of China in 1989 during which the Chinese 
government remained steadfast in its autocratic ways even as smuggled videos and 
photographs of the Tiananmen Square crackdown generated worldwide outrage. There is 
no reason to assume that today’s authoritarian regimes will reform simply because some 
graphic clips are being uploaded to YouTube. Hurdles against reform are sometimes 
compounded due to the decisions made by non-governmental actors from democratic 
countries. Not only do civil societies confront daunting challenges in their pursuit of 
digital activism even in the best of cases, but this struggle is often complicated by Social 
Media’s multi-faceted entanglements with a variety of outside actors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 V. The Complex Involvement of Outside Actors
 
 Any discussion of Social Media’s proliferation or of the rise of online activism 
would be incomplete and misleading if it framed the affair as a straightforward conflict 
between dissidents and their oppressors. Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski have 
written that “the actions of businesses, governments, civil society, criminal organizations, 
and millions of individuals affect and in turn are affected by the domain of 
cyberspace…Such a complex network cannot accurately be described in the one-
dimensional terms of ‘liberation’ or ‘control’” (“Liberation Vs. Control” 45-6). They 
argue that the Internet is instead, “composed of a constantly pulsing and at times erratic 
mix of competing forces and constraints” (Ibid. 46). The turbulent dynamics of Social 
Media proliferation have only become more complicated as recent world events have 
made the political dimensions of Internet access impossible to ignore.   
 Most Social Media and Internet tools (with the exception of some NGO-
sponsored anti-censorship/anti-surveillance software) are owned by private, for-profit 
corporations. The events of the Arab Spring have widely raised two concerns — firstly, 
that markets will become locked off to these companies as authoritarian governments 
worry about possible Social Media-facilitated revolutions in their own countries and, 
secondly, that the profit-minded shareholders of companies like Facebook will as a result 
push to limit how these platforms assist civil societies living under authoritarian 
governments (Lake). A December 2011 article in Foreign Policy magazine entitled 
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“Does Facebook Have a Foreign Policy?” noted:   
While Zuckerberg says entering China is one of Facebook’s top strategic 
priorities, it’s hard to imagine the service being allowed to operate inside 
China with the filtering and censorship routinely applied already to other 
Social Media. A Facebook spokesperson … recently told The Wall Street 
Journal that the company could even conceivably cooperate. (Kirkpatrick, 
D., “Does Facebook” 55)  
  
Facebook’s current roster of notable share-holders includes Russian media tycoons who 
actively fired and censored journalists who reported on voter fraud in Russia’s December 
2011 elections (Schwirtz, “2 Leaders”). In January 2012 Twitter announced a new 
“micro-censorship” policy based on technology that would allow it to censor specific 
tweets when these comments are viewed in countries where their contents would 
displease authorities (Sengupta, “Twitter Announces Mico-Censorship Policy”).  
 Vodafone’s cooperation with the Mubarak regime during the 2011 turmoil in 
Egypt shows that many companies are perfectly willing to perform a two-faced act, 
apologizing profusely to Western audiences back home while continuing to assist 
authoritarian regimes with propaganda bombardments and telecommunication shut-
downs abroad (Rushkoff). This seems to be a part of an ongoing trend where profit-
hungry technology companies and other corporate giants — most of them ironically from 
Western countries — have begun a feeding frenzy to join in on a new and growing “cyber 
military-industrial complex” estimated at between 80 and 150 billion dollars annually 
(Rohozinski and Deibert, “The new cyber military-industrial complex”). In a 2005 article 
John Lagerkvist identified this phenomenon early on as the “love affair and continuous 
rendezvous between managers of companies in the affluent world and security organ 
officers in the developing world”, at the time singling out Cisco Systems, Secure 
Computing, and Nortel Networks for particular criticism (Lagerkvist 121). In March 
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2011 the Canadian newspaper The Globe and Mail reported that Egyptian protestors 
raiding the headquarters of the state security headquarters found a contract for cyber-war 
software from a German company, with the article pointing out:   
[A]s the Egyptian security service files show, the market knows no 
boundaries. Advanced deep pack inspection, content filtering, social 
network mining, cell-phone tracking and computer network attack and 
exploitation capabilities, developed primarily by U.S., Canadian and 
European firms, are sold to hungry buyers worldwide – many of them 
authoritarian regimes. (Rohozinski and Deibert, “The new cyber military-
industrial complex”) 
 Even when outside companies are not willing conspirators they may still pose a 
danger to dissidents. They may be too complacent or naïve in the face of dramatic 
measures sometime taken by authoritarian regimes, as was “dramatically illustrated in the 
case of Time-Skype, in which the Chinese partner of Skype put in place a covert 
surveillance system to track and monitor prodemocracy activists who were using Skype’s 
chat function as a form of outreach” (Rohozinski and Deibert, “Liberation Vs. Control” 
52). Social Media corporations and other tech companies are stuck in an uncomfortable 
position where they have to simultaneously placate shareholders, Western governments, 
authoritarian regimes, other companies, foreign civil societies, and NGOs. This leads to 
complicated situations where private companies engage in sometimes contradictory 
behavior. It should not be forgotten that Google — whose unofficial company motto is 
“Don’t be evil” — largely complied with China’s censorship policies for almost four 
years.  
 In addition, many telecommunications and Internet companies have recently 
clashed with human rights activists and organizations because their generic policies and 
user-agreements conflicted with the needs and interests of a growing number of social 
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movements. Facebook has long insisted that its users use only their real names despite the 
obvious and grave risks that this poses for activists in authoritarian countries. In one 
famous case Facebook deleted the Arabic version of a popular anti-Mubarak Facebook 
page in the midst of Egypt’s uprising simply because the page’s founder, Wael Ghonim, 
had set the page up under a fake name (Sengupta, “Rushdie Runs Afoul”). Even recent 
policy changes by Facebook to accommodate celebrities with stage names still required 
these users to post their legal names somewhere on their profiles (Sengupta, “Lady Gaga 
Now”). Other popular platforms have similarly damaged online activism as a 
consequence of sticking to generic company policies. YouTube has occasionally deleted 
graphic videos proving state torture or violence, and Flickr has deleted similar images 
simply because the pictures posted on the popular graphic-sharing site were not originally 
shot by the same individuals who ended up posting them (Preston, “Ethical Quandary”).   
 High-profile efforts have been made to push companies towards adopting 
sophisticated policies that protect human rights and dissents. This famously includes the 
Global Network Initiative, a voluntary code of conduct for technology companies set up 
in 2008. However, many of the primary Social Media and Internet companies 
increasingly used by civil societies are powerful enough to shrug off such calls in the face 
of possible hostility from authoritarian regimes (Preston, “Facebook Officials”). This 
seems to indicate that sometimes more pressure will need to be applied to large Social 
Media websites and technology companies by Western audiences and governments in 
order for these corporations to be motivated enough to adjust their policies. The issue of 
corporate culpability is obviously even more acute when dealing with the Web tools and 
companies that actually come from authoritarian countries of origin. Many of these have 
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extremely complicated public-private relationships with the regime and are thus easily 
pressured — an issue compounded by the fact that authoritarian governments have 
typically made moves to provide these domestic platforms with advantages or total 
monopolies compared to outside (and especially) Western websites and Social Media 
tools. Yandex, a popular Russian search engine with a two-thirds domestic market share, 
ended its practice of featuring blogs in its news section based on popularity once the 
content featured there pushed past the Kremlin’s tolerance for regime-critical content 
(Kempf).  
 However, despite numerous challenges, many new bright spots have emerged for 
those who view the Internet as a potent instrument for freedom and civil empowerment. 
The progress of technological advancement means that even regions that currently seem 
rather devoid of online activity and Internet access contain the potential to develop online 
activism and citizen networks in the future. For example, in 2010 Facebook announced 
its new Facebook Zero program, a service with 50 African mobile operators in 25 
countries letting African mobile-phone users access and use Facebook for free even when 
they have no credit let on their phones (Hersman). In April 2011, Charles Shield of the 
TechChange Institute interviewed Dr. Raul Zambrano of the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), who emphasized how dramatically technological 
developments from the mid-2000s on have altered online access even in poorer countries:   
[With traditional computers] you need space, and the space needs to be air 
conditioned. This adds to electricity costs, and infrastructure. You need to 
maintain the computers and update them … This is what makes mobile 
technology so important. It doesn’t require the extensive infrastructure, 
people can use the technology from within their traditional social 
networks, and they are able to have a broader voice through SMS, social 
media or email. (Shield)   
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Shield himself described seeing this change in action as a Peace Corps volunteer in 
Samoa in 2006, when the first GSM digital mobile phone system went online: “Prior to 
that mobile phones were rare, and only worked in the capital city. When the GSM system 
came online, mobile telephony became accessible countrywide, and suddenly texts, 
photos and emails were being sent from the farthest corners of the island” (Ibid.). In same 
vein, future innovations might also offer new and creative ways for civil societies to get 
online even in countries already featuring extensive telecommunications infrastructure. 
 Shervin Pishevar, a technology expert and angel financier who helped to inspire 
some parts of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s “Internet Freedom” speech, responded 
to the authoritarian assaults on Internet infrastructure during the Arab Spring by starting a 
new global volunteer project called OpenMesh to create “ad hoc wireless mesh networks” 
with tiny private routers that can be hidden in people’s pockets:   
“OpenMesh’s basic idea is that we could use some new techniques to 
create a secondary wireless Internet in countries like Libya, Syria, Iran, 
North Korea and other repressive regimes to allow citizens to 
communicate freely. By creating mobile routers that connect together we 
could create a wireless network that mobile phones and personal 
computers can connect to … each connected node in the network may act 
as an independent router or ‘smart’ device, regardless of whether it has an 
Internet connection or not. Mesh networks are incredibly robust, with 
continuous connections that can reconfigure around broken or blocked 
paths by ‘hopping’ from node to node until the destination is reached, such 
as another device on the network or connecting to an Internet back 
haul…When there isn’t [local Internet available], mesh networks can 
allow people to communicate with each other in the event that other forms 
of electronic communication are broken down.” (Pishevar)  
The New America Foundation is likewise currently developing mobile kits for Wi-Fi 
networks that can be set up and run outside of government control in authoritarian 
countries (Andrews).  
 Other organizations are no doubt working on similar projects, meaning that new 
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possibilities for online social activism are rich even in those countries where authoritarian 
regimes are growing increasingly sophisticated at monitoring and controlling existing 
Internet infrastructures. Freedom House even has its own “Internet Freedom Team” that 
provides services to global dissidents and activists, including online YouTube tutorials on 
installing anti-censorship and anti-surveillance software (Freedom House). Google and 
Twitter were especially proactive when the Arab Spring began in January, hot-fixing a 
“speak-to-tweet service” within a matter of days (Google). As the Mubarak regime 
responded to the unrest by cutting off Internet access while still mostly retaining mobile-
phone and telephone landline services, Google and Twitter created a program where 
Egyptians could simply call an international phone number and leave a message that 
would automatically be translated into tweets with the “hashtag” (the term for a Twitter 
topic identifier) “#Egypt” (Ibid.). Similarly, after Egypt’s Internet was first shut down, 
over 30 international ISPs offered Egyptian dissidents dial-up services for getting online 
by creating dial-in numbers and entry codes via international phone lines (San Francisco 
Chronicle).   
 Internet skeptics and pessimistic academics are naturally extremely wary of 
foreign governments and NGOs blazing onto the scene to help civil societies in their 
complicated struggles. This position is perhaps best epitomized by Morozov’s scathing 
criticism of the U.S. State Department’s decision to publicly intervene in 2009 when 
Twitter was set to go temporarily offline for scheduled maintenance during a key moment 
in the Green Revolution. Arguing that this disenfranchised the real-world actions of the 
protestors and enabled the Iranian regime to paint Social Media and its users as tools of 
Western imperialists, Morozov has made a small career of highlighting these sorts of 
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“policy blunders” (Morozov, The Net Delusion). Although outside actors have certainly 
made mistakes since the advent of the Web 2.0 era, the consequences of these decisions 
are not always as clear as either Internet proponents or Internet skeptics portray them. For 
example, Iranian journalist and filmmaker Maziar Bahari, author of the new book And 
Then They Came for Me: A Family's Story of Love, Captivity and Survival, publicly 
advocates more foreign support for online activism in Iran. Despite spending 118 days in 
solitary confinement in Tehran’s notorious Evin Prison in 2009 and despite observing the 
regime’s suppression of Internet activism, Bahari struck an optimistic tone when 
interviewed about the future of his country in 2011:   
The Iranian regime is a 20th-century dictatorship. It is not equipped to rule 
in the 21
st
 century. It is a regime that is prepared to block short-wave 
radios and newspapers. But it cannot fight against the Internet, text 
messaging, and satellite television … we are witnessing the flourishing of 
citizen media. Young Iranians are using the government's deficiency in 
targeting new media to their advantage … I think that with time and more 
training, and with the help of the outside world, [online citizen journalism] 
could flourish and be more effective in gathering and disseminating 
information. (Nikou) 
Outside help and training have certainly been on the rise. In addition to the efforts of 
NGOs and private companies mentioned earlier, the U.S. State Department has in recent 
years embarked on a major journey of global support for Internet dissidence.   
 Following the gripping events of Iran’s 2009 Green Revolution, the State 
Department began a set of policy adjustments that ultimately culminated in a set of 
projects called the “21st Century Statecraft” initiative, unveiled by Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton in her “Internet Freedom” speech on January 21st, 2010 at the Newseum 
in Washington, D.C.:   
To meet these 21st century challenges, we need to use the tools, the new 
21st Century Statecraft. And we’ve begun to do that. We have seen the 
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possibilities of what can happen when ordinary citizens are empowered by 
Twitter and Facebook to organize political movements, or simply 
exchange ideas and information. So we find ourselves living at a moment 
in human history when we have the potential to engage in these new and 
innovative forms of diplomacy and to also use them to help individuals be 
empowered for their own development. (Heritage Foundation; Morozov, 
“Is Hillary Clinton”, “The 20th century roots”)  
This speech outlined the U.S. new position on the global use of online communication 
technologies, adding a new, fifth fundamental “human freedom” to the four first 
articulated by President Roosevelt in 1941 — namely, the freedom to connect to the 
Internet.   
 By aggressively championing such a full-throated defensive of Internet freedom, 
the State Department seems to have perceptively positioned itself at the forefront of an 
emerging global opinion trend. In June 2011 a special rapporteur to the United Nations 
issued a report on the Arab Spring which argued that the Internet had “become an 
indispensable tool for realizing a range of human rights” (Olivarez-Giles). A 2010 BBC 
World Service poll across 26 different countries found that 80% of those polled agreed 
that Internet access is a fundamental right, and numerous international bodies such as the 
E.U. are increasingly tying Internet access to the “fundamental rights and freedoms of 
citizens” (BBC News, “Internet access”). These developments have accelerated as a 
result of the monumental events that transpired across the globe in 2011; high-level 
European Union officials are now increasingly highlighting the link between Social 
Media and human rights and noting that infringements on free Internet access by 
authoritarian governments would amount to a “violation of fundamental rights” that 
would elicit a response from the E.U. (European Union Delegation). Interestingly, the 
E.U. is even following up on the implications of this paradigm by working on legislation 
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that would grant its own citizens a spectrum of new digital rights such as the “right to be 
forgotten,” which includes a person’s prerogative to force Social Media corporations and 
other Internet companies to delete all of the data it has collected on that individual (The 
Economist, “Private data, public rules”). While some experts have warned not to confuse 
the human right to speech or privacy with a right to a medium such as the Internet (Cerf), 
the very existence of this discourse speaks to the philosophical seriousness with which 
public figures are now debating Internet use and access.  
 In February 2011 Secretary Clinton gave a second Internet freedom speech which 
largely followed up on the events unfolding across the Middle East as a part of the Arab 
Spring. Her second speech reiterated the U.S. position advocating global access to a free 
and safe Internet and touted State Department involvement in projects like the Global 
Network Initiative and the Civil Society 2.0 Initiative (RealClearPolitics). As the Arab 
Spring developed, it eventually materialized that the State Department was far more 
closely involved in sponsoring foreign online activism than previously thought. As 
revealed by The New York Times in April 2011:    
Even as the United States poured billions of dollars into foreign military 
programs and anti-terrorism campaigns, a small core of American 
government-financed organizations were promoting democracy in 
authoritarian Arab states … the United States’ democracy-building 
campaigns played a bigger role in fomenting protests than was previously 
known, with key leaders of the movements having been trained by the 
Americans in campaigning, organizing through new media tools and 
monitoring elections. A number of the groups and individuals directly 
involved in the revolts and reforms sweeping the region, including the 
April 6 Youth Movement in Egypt, the Bahrain Center for Human Rights 
and grass-roots activists like Entsar Qadhi, a youth leader in Yemen, 
received training and financing from groups like the International 
Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute and Freedom 
House, a nonprofit human rights organization based in Washington. 
(Nixon)  
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 Although such funding for Social Media and organizational training for foreign 
activists already indicated an extremely close level of American involvement, a second 
follow-up article later reported that the State Department’s projects have actually 
extended far beyond even those measures: “The Obama administration is leading a global 
effort to deploy ‘shadow’ Internet and mobile phone systems that dissidents can use to 
undermine repressive governments that seek to silence them by censoring or shutting 
down telecommunications networks” (Markoff and Glanz, “U.S. Underwrites”). These 
efforts include collaborations with NGOs, academic institutions, hacktivists, and global 
dissidents on projects ranging from mesh networks to surveillance-evading Bluetooth 
phone networks to anti-cyber-surveillance training for foreign activists. According to 
State Department figures, spending on circumvention efforts and similar technologies 
were projected to have totaled seventy million dollars by the end of 2011 (Ibid.).   
 Unfortunately, even with all of the Western funding and attention now being 
spent on supporting Internet freedom and foreign dissidents, missteps and sloppy holes in 
national policies still occur. Counter-productive Web 2.0 technology bans to authoritarian 
countries and a continuing flow of Western technological expertise involved in the 
construction of digital censorship and tracking architectures demonstrate that democratic 
governments still have a lot of work left to do if they want to be fully supportive of the 
online activities of foreign civil societies (Rhoads; New York Times; Morozov, “Does 
Wen Jiabao”). The State Department’s bungled attempt to help Iranian dissidents by 
blessing unpolished, privately-developed anticensorship software resulted in an 
embarrassing scandal now known as the “Haystack affair” (The Economist, “Worse than 
useless”; Morozov, “More tech-related,” “One week,” “Were Haystack’s”). Initiatives 
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supporting Internet freedom have also not come without a diplomatic price; authoritarian 
countries such as China have repeatedly blasted the United States for promoting Internet 
freedom and Social Media in Iran and other places (Hornby). Future efforts to foster 
online activism and free Internet access are certain to become entangled in the messy 
affairs of global geo-politics and international business interests.  
 VI. Conclusions – Judging the Consequences of Social Media Proliferation 
 
 The scholarship on Social Media’s impact in repressive countries is currently in 
fluid but inconclusive shape. Optimists are sparing with pessimists in defining the 
possibilities as well as limitations of Social Media’s current and future political potential. 
Some scholars are straddling the fence on this issue, seemingly unable to decide whether 
the glass is half empty or half full. This seems to some degree like a repeat of the 
academic debates on Internet democratization that took place in the pre-Web 2.0 era; in 
2004 political communications scholars Bruce Williams and Michael Delli Carpini 
remarked:  
[O]ptimistically we believe that the erosion of gatekeeping and the 
emergence of multiple axes of information provide new opportunities to 
challenge elite control of political issues. Pessimistically we are skeptical 
of the ability of ordinary citizens to make use of these opportunities and 
suspicious of the degree to which even multiple axes of power are still 
shaped by more fundamental structures of economic and political power. 
(Williams and Delli Carpini 1209)  
  
Ironically, this modern-day return to a more hesitant, inconclusive consensus concerning 
the Internet’s impact is, in and of itself, to some degree a sign of progress.   
 In the first several years following the emergence of Web 2.0 tools, scholars often 
fell into camps either overestimating or underestimating Social Media’s political 
potential. As a result, by 2010 experts were advocating that “Scholars and policymakers 
should adopt a more nuanced view of new media’s role in democratization and social 
change, one that recognizes that new media can have both positive and negative effects” 
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(Aday et al. 3). The empirical information collected and analyzed in this thesis would 
concur with this recommendation, insofar that it suggests that the Internet and Social 
Media platforms are complex tools that can be wielded effectively by both civil societies 
and by authoritarian regimes. When the accelerating rate of Internet- and security-related 
technological development and other factors such as the involvement of outside actors are 
added in as well, we are left with a context in which it becomes very difficult to predict in 
advance whether or not these new online tools will succeed in providing meaningful 
leverage to a particular civil society or social movement.   
 Despite such (warranted) equivocations, the inherently rapid, fluid, and chaotic 
nature of the Internet will likely favor social movements and civil societies over 
authoritarian governments in the long-term. The spread of Web 2.0 platforms may 
ultimately prove to be more advantageous for burgeoning social movements and civil 
societies than for repressive states as a result of the Internet’s capacity and tendency to 
transnationalize conflicts. In the late 1990s scholars were already finding that ICTs were 
making collaboration between different social movements more likely (Ayres). Bert 
Hoffman remarked in January 2011, “The forms of and degree of the limits various 
authoritarian regimes impose on public articulation of voice vary, but no matter which 
regime is in question, the regime’s reach is largely limited to the territorial boundaries of 
the nation-state in which it exercise power” (6). In contrast, the Internet’s 
transnationalization of communication and social movements is of great benefit to civil 
societies, as “The inherently trans-border character of web-based communication and 
media technologies challenges established ‘filters’ in access and patterns of regulation in 
any state” (Ibid.). Philip Howard and Muzammil Hussain highlighted this digital 
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transnationalization of the Arab Spring in a 2011 article, pointing out that, “Within a few 
weeks, there were widely circulating PDFs of tip sheets on how to pull off a successful 
protest. The Atlantic Monthly translated and hosted an ‘Activist Action Plan’, 
boingboing.net provided tips for protecting anonymity online, and Telecomix circulated 
the ways of using landlines to circumvent state blockages of broad networks” (40). Anti-
authoritarian activists and protest movements are much more likely to trade Internet-
related expertise and experiences over national borders than sovereign, authoritarian 
states.  
 Of course, cross-border information-, technology-, and technique-sharing is not 
universally lopsided purely in favor of dissidents. Several authoritarian regimes (such as 
those in Syria and Iran) enjoy unusually close and mutually-supportive relations. Larry 
Diamond has noted, “[A]uthoritarian states such as China, Belarus, and Iran have 
acquired (and shared) impressive technological capacities to filter and control the 
Internet, and to identify and punish dissidents” (70). Such exchanges actually began long 
before the Social Media protests of the modern era first began spooking authoritarian 
rulers. In 2005 John Lagerkvist wrote about his long-term concerns about the possible 
circulation of learning within “authoritarian networks”, noting, “Networking between the 
governments of China, Vietnam and Singapore on how to control modern information 
and communication flows is increasing” (121).   
 If anything, world events since 2009 may encourage repressive regimes to 
significantly ramp up efforts at such collaborations. Nonetheless, authoritarian states are 
typically characterized by numerous incentives not to engage in this type of close 
cooperation. Whereas — as discussed throughout this thesis — social movements can 
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greatly benefit from the successful transnationalization and international advertising of 
their plight and causes, authoritarian states by definition fear both foreign and domestic 
challenges to their hegemonies on power. This discourages them from sharing sensitive, 
embarrassing, or potentially compromising information on internal security challenges 
and information controls. The amplification of anti-authoritarian causes and social 
movements to a more global stage does indeed seem to provide a much bigger 
opportunity for civil societies than it does for authoritarian governments.  
 Most repressive regimes would most likely prefer to return to a pre-Internet age in 
which the public sphere was dominated by the state, unfiltered information was hard to 
obtain, and social movements were easier to monitor and slower to explode. As one local 
propaganda official in China has put it, “It was so much better when there was no 
Internet” (Qiang, “The Battle” 56). Although the rise of Social Media has provided 
authoritarian governments with new avenues for monitoring and influencing their 
citizens, this advantage is largely dependent on maintaining a type of technological 
superiority that will be constantly challenged by the creativity of dissidents and by the 
interference of outside actors. This thesis therefore agrees with the findings promoted in 
2010 by Peter Van Aelst and Jereon Van Laer when they wrote that,   
Although Goliath can use the Internet as well, the relative advantage of 
this new technology is bigger for David. Several authors have indeed 
shown that social movements, being networks of diverse groups and 
activists, are especially keen on using the Internet because of its fluid, 
non-hierarchical structure, which ‘matches’ their ideological and 
organizational needs. This is far less the case for organizations or actors 
that have a more hierarchical and formal structure, where the Internet is 
often seen more as a threat and less an opportunity (Van Laer
 
 and Van 
Aelst 1146) 
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The great bulk of the more skeptical literature written on this topic by Lyon, Morozov, 
Gladwell, and even Van Laer and Van Aelst themselves were published prior to the 
emergence of enduring Internet-supported reform movements in the Arab Spring 
countries, Russia, and China in 2011 and 2012. The empirical cases discussed in this 
thesis seem to refute earlier pessimists who claimed that the Internet lacks a core capacity 
to bind people together in sustained and politically noteworthy social movements.  
 Web 2.0 platforms such as Social Media have had a greater and faster political 
impact than prior Internet tools because they are shaped to such a large extent by user 
feedback and user interactions. One scholar noted in 1999 that Internet activism can be 
lower than expected because websites are “often designed with simplistic and often 
unfounded assumptions about why individuals participate in politics, which may result in 
design flaws” (Tambini 322). In contrast, Web 2.0 tools and Social Media platforms in 
particular are extremely fluid, as their political utility and sometimes even their actual 
user-interfaces are constantly reshaped by user feedback and online interactions. Manuel 
Castells has written, “The new media politics shows remarkable capacity to innovate, 
following the steps of the culture of social networking reinvented every day by web 
users” (“Communication” 256). Empirical studies of new ICTs in developing countries 
have similarly found that Web 2.0 tools “create new modes of social interaction” and that 
“the users create and shape new applications and functions as well as influence and 
determine the development of new technology. This is a unique aspect of new ICTs” 
(SIDA 86). Given such responsiveness and utility, it seems less surprising that Social 
Media has been adopted so successfully and widely by many burgeoning civil societies 
and social movements — even in countries under authoritarian rule.  
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 This adoption represents a fundamental change in the internal political dynamics 
of nations ruled by repressive regimes. As proven by a flurry of recent events around the 
globe, the Internet’s impact on social movements is powerful, complex, and sometimes 
unpredictable. The Internet’s low barrier to participation and its ease of 
transnationalization have had such a profound socio-political impact that the findings of 
several scholars “suggest that we even need to reconsider” the relevance and applicability 
of the existing “terms of traditional social movements and mobilization literature” 
(Tatarchevskiy 300). So-called “Internet optimist” Clay Shirky has summarized these 
developments by writing that, “The current change, in one sentence, is this: most of the 
barriers to group action have collapsed, and without those barriers, we are free to explore 
new ways of gathering together and getting things done” (Here Comes Everybody 22).   
 In addition to studying the Internet’s implications for social movement literature, 
scholars have also worked in the reverse direction by using frameworks developed in the 
study of social movements in order to better understand new ICTS (Garrett). These 
findings have complemented the academic literature of the pre-Web 2.0 era of the early 
2000s, which generated strong evidence to suggest that “people who use the Internet to 
gather information and exchange ideas are more socially and politically engaged” 
(Mendelson 183; Quan-Hasse et al.; Shah, Kwak, and Holbert; Zeitner and Jennings). 
Other scholarship from this period likewise found, “In some locations, public access ICT 
users have been found to develop leadership characteristics, becoming more active in 
local and national politics, as well as public access centers themselves acting as meeting 
grounds for civil activity” (Center for Information and Society 13; Etta and Parvyn-
Wamahiu; Patra, Pal, and Brewer). The early literature on Internet proliferation therefore 
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suggested that this growth could have a transforming effect on how individuals viewed 
and approached society as a whole.    
 The more recent developments discussed in this thesis seem to corroborate this 
phenomenon. Several studies have concluded, “New communication technologies have 
become the infrastructure for sharing and learning about diverse views and for new 
approaches to political representation and participation” (Haider 3). The early research on 
Social Media has found that these tools can lower the cost of mobilization and 
participation, contribute to the development of community and collective identity, and 
facilitate collective action through framing processes (Garrett). A 2009 empirical study of 
democratization in Africa reported that the rapid spread of new ICTs “is making 
information available instantly and at low cost to a degree unprecedented in history” a 
revolutionary development that, “enhances freedom of expression and the right to 
information, and increases the possibilities for citizen’s participation in decision-making 
processes” (SIDA 29). Communications scholar Manuel Castells has argued, “For new 
social movements, the Internet provides the essential platform for debate, their means of 
acting on people’s mind, and ultimately serves as their most potent political weapon” 
(“Communication” 250). China scholar Xiao Qiang wrote in April 2011 that, in China 
“the expansion of the Internet and Web-based media is changing the rules of the game 
between society and society” and that the Internet is now acting as, “a catalyst for social 
and political transformation” ( “The Battle” 47, 60). A 2010 empirical study of the Arabic 
blogosphere found that, despite increases in the harassment and arrests of Arabic 
bloggers, it was rapidly fostering an emerging area of political discourse that met Yochai 
Benkler’s definition of a networked public sphere (Palfrey et al. 1240; Benkler).   
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 The most recent wave of Social Media-powered protests in 2011 and 2012 have 
brought in a flood of new and world-changing cases that have made the connection 
between the Internet and social movement a top priority for academic study; Philip 
Howard and Muzammil Hussain argued in July 2011, “Scholars of social movements, 
collection action, and revolution must admit that several aspects of the Arab Spring 
challenge our theories about how such protests work” (48). In their eyes, Social Media 
now represents, “the scaffolding upon which civil society can build.” (Ibid.). A 2011 
Foreign Policy magazine article on the global protests of 2011 used a similar metaphor: 
“Facebook is a common thread in all these movements — it has become the new 
infrastructure of protest” (Kirkpatrick, D., “Does Facebook” 55). The technological 
tsunami sweeping the globe in recent years has generated an increased capacity among 
many of the citizens living in authoritarian nations to exchange information, voice 
opinions, and communicate freely through growing Social Media and Internet access. 
This has amounted to a dramatic infusion of the building blocks required for civil 
societies to successfully foster reforms and social movements.     
 Social Media’s most profound impact may therefore turn out to be long-term. 
Although the street revolutions and reform petitions that have been inspired and 
facilitated by Social Media are noteworthy (to say the least), the most important legacies 
of these new tools may lay far outside any empirical analysis possible at present time for 
such a new phenomenon. In its 2009 working paper on the global spread of ICTs, the 
Center for Information and Society concluded, “Changes brought about as a result of the 
use of information and communication generally occur through indirect processes, 
making it difficult to identity causal relationships. Debates rage about impact and when it 
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happens” (16). The report decried the “tendency to view impacts in binary and/or linear 
terms,” as “In reality, the process through which ICT impacts may or may not occur is 
more complex, and an apparent absence of impacts could be misleading” (Ibid. 17).   
 Clay Shirky has argued that “Social Media’s real potential lies in supporting civil 
society and the public sphere — which will produce change over years and decades, not 
weeks or months” (“The Political Power”). A 2009 empirical investigation by the SIDA 
institute on the same subject agreed, concluding that new ICTs “change the notion of 
business, trade, civil society, the media; they enable direct democracy and non-traditional 
forms of advocacy and engagement between citizens and the state” (SIDA 60). In the 
context of Russia, Leon Aron has written that Ru.net is not only a source of uncensored 
information and news, but even “an open public space where public opinion is shaped 
and through which policies occasionally could be influenced — a virtual town hall, where 
one’s voice can be heard and debated by fellow citizens” (3). Russia’s netizens and 
online media sites have even attempted to “forge democratic institutions to parallel the 
ones subverted by the regime” by holding virtual elections for the mayor of Moscow and 
the national parliament (Ibid. 5). If it is indeed true that the Internet will eventually 
generate new public spheres of the kind long discussed by mainstream scholars 
(Habermas), then it may well be that the most important consequences of Social Media 
proliferation still remain to be seen.  
 Language barriers, geopolitical divisions, poverty, telecommunications control, 
infrastructure derailment, surveillance innovations, physical repression, and co-option 
tactics have all failed to stave off either Social Media’s popularity or its tendency to 
challenge individuals about their roles in society. There is a great deal of evidence to 
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suggest that Social Media proliferation may prove to be a “game-changer” for traditional 
assumptions about the growth and limitations of social movements. A wide variety of 
events around the world are increasingly pointing authoritarian regimes towards the same 
tentative but terrifying conclusion: Social Media’s accelerating impact stems not only 
from the dizzying pace of technological innovation, but also from Web 2.0’s ability to 
fundamentally transform how individuals interact with one another and within society as 
a whole.   
 These ongoing transformations will likely plow steadily forward even in the face 
of the most sophisticated repression tactics and the largest possible cadres of Internet 
police. Since bottom-up technological and social innovation are extremely difficult for 
centralized regimes to artificially reverse with top-down measures, authoritarian 
governments will likely come to find that Social Media is a genie that can never be put 
back in the bottle. This threatens the carefully-crafted narratives and social norms meant 
to persuade citizens in authoritarian countries that their social and political identities can 
only exist inside the frameworks constructed by the government. If Web 2.0 tools 
succeed in freeing not only the voices but even the very identities of citizens living under 
authoritarian rule, this would represent a fundamental, irrevocable change for such 
societies — a revolution in the truest sense of the word.  
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